Today, Karl Popper is known chiefly as a leading exponent of "critical rationalism" in philosophy and of the hypothetico-deductive method in science. Ironically, he has even been accorded the title of secular pope by one philosopher for his eagerness to draw the "line of demarcation" between scientific propositions (falsifiable by reference to "experience") and metaphysical, theological, ethical, and "value" statements generally which fall on the other side of the line.

As Henry Veatch has noted, Popper "has always refused to go along with the old-line positivists and simply write off metaphysics, theology, ethics and et al. as 'meaningless.'" Nonetheless, as Veatch points out, the effect of the "line of demarcation" would appear to be to deflate the importance of discourse on the "other" (non-scientific) side of the line. Popper's intention, however, has been otherwise, for he has always attached the utmost significance to his normative political and social theory, provided that it be regarded as an affirmation of faith consistent with his epistemology of "critical rationalism."

In particular, in political and social thought, Popper has emerged as a champion of his own version of the "open society." After a brief biographical introduction, we shall turn to an account of the argument in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and conclude with some more sustained critical observations.

**Popper's Biography**

Karl Popper was born in Vienna in 1902. He was ethnically Jewish, but was brought up as a Protestant. By his own account, he "became a Marxist" at the early age of thirteen, but rejected Marx-

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1 See the philosopher Henry Veatch's delightful article "A Neglected Avenue in Contemporary Religious Apologetics," in *Religious Studies* (1977, 29-48, at 31. "Time was when only a pope was deemed a fit officer to draw a line of demarcation; but nowadays this one-time papal function would appear to have devolved upon an unblushing and ever ready Sir Karl."


ism in 1919 when he was seventeen. He "remained a socialist" until he was thirty, although he "began to doubt more and more whether freedom and socialism are compatible." By the time he wrote his book on the open society, he saw himself as an "individualist" opposed in theory to the use of dangerous abstractions such as "mankind" and "class" and in practice to such proposals as the nationalization of the means of production, whether endorsed by Marxists or non-Marxists.4

At the age of 28, Popper began to teach at a secondary school in Vienna. In 1934 he published what was to be a famous book on epistemology and the scientific method called the Logik der Forschung, later translated as The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Apprehensive about the rise of Nazism, he emigrated to England and in 1936 went to the University of New Zealand as a University Lecturer in Philosophy.

Popper tells us that he first hit upon the term "the open society" as a result of his visits to Great Britain in the mid-thirties. "I now found that I could at last breathe freely," he wrote. "It was as if windows had been flung open. The term 'open society' . . . derives from this experience."5 His plan to write a book on the subject originated in 1938 with Hitler's invasion of Austria. The book presently under review was finished in New Zealand in 1943 and first published in 1945; it is now in its fifth edition.

The success of the Open Society book was immediate, and, together with his earlier work on scientific inquiry insured his reputation. In 1946 Karl Popper was called to be a Chair Professor at the London School of Economics, where he enjoyed immense success as a scholar, teacher, and public figure. His influence spread both in Europe and in America, with many scholars hailing him as the leading figure in contemporary liberal thought. Knighted in 1965, he retired in 1969. Other major works by Popper include The Poverty of Historicism (1957), Conjectures and Refutations (1963), and Objective Knowledge (1972).

The Argument of The Open Society and Its Enemies

Volume I: Plato

Popper's by now "classic" work runs to around 750 pages, including over 200 pages of footnotes. It requires considerable temerity to

5 Ibid., p. 14.
attempt to summarize so diffuse a work as this one, and the present reviewer makes no claim to completeness. However, we shall concentrate on the two themes indicated in the title: the "open society" and the "enemies" thereof.

The work is divided into two parts, entitled respectively, *The Spell of Plato* and the second, *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*. The three "enemies" of the open society, then, are Plato, Hegel, and Marx. The "movement to build up an open society" began in earnest three centuries ago; however, there were important glimmerings of the movement in the age of Pericles. In general, the movement is dedicated to freeing men from the "tutelage of authority and prejudice" (*The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols., 1966 edition, I, viii-ix; hereinafter cited as I or II and the page numbers).

There is something reminiscent of Manichaeanism in Popper's division of all social reality into two camps, one the children of light (the "open society" which sets free the critical powers of man,) and the other the children of darkness (the "closed society" with its submission to magical forces").

To present Popper's argument as a simplistic account of a conflict between the "good guys" and the "bad guys" would be misleading, even if it is true that he sometimes writes in such a way as to encourage such an impression. Actually, his work is a sophisticated and wide-ranging attempt at a political and social theory consistent with his epistemology. He uses his principal "enemies" of openness as foils for developing his own theory, and sufficient attention has already been paid by able scholars to the obvious absurdities and inaccuracies of his interpretations of Plato and Hegel. My purpose will be to focus on Popper's own often eloquent and significant, but inadequate and defective, restatement of an individualist conception of politics.

society, and history which does not conform to the Popperian criteria for good social science. Needless to say, the authors of the Old Testament, having remained in benighted ignorance of "critical rationalism," the "line of demarcation," the fact-value distinction, and "piecemeal social engineering," commit one naturalistic fallacy after another and completely flunk the Popperian test of openness (I, 8-9).

After a passing swipe at Heraclitus (he was, it seems the spiritual father of Hegel, who inspired both Fascism and Nazism, and he brought historicism to the Hellenic world), Popper moves with relish into the main subject of Volume I: Plato. Plato's genius was to have combined two seemingly opposed approaches (historicism and social engineering) into a single compelling doctrine. Historicism stresses the inevitability of change and decay, according to deterministic laws, while social engineering affirms the possibility of man's consciously guiding the course of things in a direction which he desires.

Through his theory of forms, Plato manages to combine these seemingly opposed positions by articulating a paradigm which will serve as a timeless model to which the legislator may have recourse in order to retard or even redirect the otherwise fatal process of historical decline and atrophy (I, 31).

In general, Popper contends, Plato saw the Greek polis to have been in a process of steady decline from its halcyon early past of tribalism. Especially with Pericles and the advent of mass democracy, the Athens of old had disintegrated completely. Now the task was to form a new ruling class educated in Plato's "tribal" principles, and subjected to a rigidly collectivist discipline, based on the abolition of property and family (I, 54).

Before embarking further on a criticism of Plato, Popper engages in one of his many digressions to make explicit his own criteria for an adequate social science. (It will come as no surprise that Plato flunks the Popperian test of adequacy even more severely than did Moses and the prophets.) He contrasts his position ("critical dualism") with that of the "naive monism" of most champions of the "closed society." Naive monism is the doctrine of those who refuse to accept the fundamental distinction between nomos and physis, and who insist on regarding society's laws as equivalent to the invariable laws of nature. Thus, apparently (although there is a good deal of loose writing in this section) any advocate of the natural (moral)
The law tradition is accused of having embraced monism (whether "naive" or otherwise) and to have committed the "naturalistic fallacy" of collapsing norms into facts.

Actually, Popper distinguishes between three positions: "naive monism," "critical dualism," and Plato's position which allegedly seeks to re-establish monism after the distinction between nature and convention had been made by the sophists and others, thus reclosing what had been opened. A curious result of Popper's analysis in this section is to reject the whole natural law tradition as monistic in some form or other; I say that it is curious because one would have thought that having a higher moral law to which to appeal beyond the existing laws and customs of society would seem to embody a dualistic approach. Whether "uncritical dualism" or "sophisticated monism" would be the better description for Plato's position, as Popper sees it, is a debatable point (I, 57-60).

In any event, "critical dualism" or "ethical decisionism" recognizes moral laws or norms to be the result of human decisions, for which those who make them must take full responsibility, rather than being a reflection of a natural order.

It is true that Popper's position does have at least one point in common with the natural law idea: it insists on the open or "rational" person's adopting a standard in terms of which he or she will judge the relative justice or injustice of existing norms, laws, customs, and traditions. However, "even these standards are of our own making in the sense that our decision in favor of them is our own decision. . . The standards are not to be found in nature. Nature consists of facts and regularities, and is in itself neither moral nor immoral. It is we who impose our standards upon nature. . ." (I, 61; emphasis added).

Popper's position, once more, is that his formation of critical dualism allows for a variety of justifications of moral standards which "we" critically adopt. He claims that it has all the advantages of a natural law position (its critical stance vis a vis existing norms) but none of the disadvantages (claiming to discover norms "written into" the natural world, as it were). To say that norms are man-made need not imply that man has no responsibility to or experience of God but only that "we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither. nature or God" because we decide to implement them whether we believe them to issue from the authority of God or on
whatever basis we hold to be appropriate. "Whatever authority we accept, it is we who accept it." (I, 73).

Chapter 6, entitled "Totalitarian Justice" is one of the best known parts of Popper's book and accordingly may receive brief treatment here. Basically it involves the contention that Plato consciously and covertly (dishonestly) subverted the egalitarian and individualist ideals of Pericles' funeral oration and the "open society" by taking the terms "justice" and "equality" and endowing them with a holistic and totalitarian content. Plato makes the reader think he is supporting justice when in fact he is advocating a society based on injustice and privilege.

Plato has throughout the centuries fooled men into believing that he really was for justice. In fact he was utterly opposed to the Western tradition of individualism and egalitarianism begun by Socrates and continued by Christianity and Kant and the Enlightenment which has become the "basis of our western civilization." (I, 102). Plato is therefore, truly an, or even the, archenemy of the "open society." To the doctrine of individualism Plato opposed his theory of the "caste state." "Love your tribe" rather than "love your neighbor" is the motto of such a state (Ibid.). Plato is said to have caricatured individualism by equating it with the nihilism expounded by Thrasymachus in the Republic. At the same time, he pretended to fulfill the individual in an unprecedented way through incorporating him into the paradigm or new social whole.

In fact, Plato made common cause with "totalitarian militarists and admirers of Sparta." "Never was a man more in earnest in his hostility towards the individual. And the hatred is deeply rooted in the fundamental dualism [!] of Plato's philosophy; he hated the individual and his freedom just as he hated the varying particular experiences, the variety of the changing world of sensible things. In the field of politics, the individual is to Plato the Evil One himself." (I, 103-104).

Plato has managed to hoodwink later generations of gullible scholars who have consistently idealized him, treating him with kid gloves, and equating his paradigm with some transcendental City of God, when in fact it has sinister purposes for the City of Man. In truth, Plato's political and moral views are "anti-humanitarian and anti-Christian." Yet he has been interpreted by Ernest Barker and others as humane, altruistic, unselfish, and even as a Christian before Christ (I, 104). He has succeeded in this deception by con-
vincing people that individualism is the same thing as selfishness while holism is the same as unselfishness. In fact, individualism is opposed to collectivism of "holism" while "egoism" is opposed to altruism or selflessness. Plato succeeds in obfuscating the issue by equating "egoism" and individualism.

It is through unknowing acceptance of Platonic or Platonizing ideas such as holism and historicism that institutions such as censorship and the Inquisition came to be accepted by Christianity. Christianity at the time of the Inquisition was "dominated by totalitarian ideas" (I, 104).

Because of his "radical collectivism," Plato is "not even interested" in what people usually mean by justice: the "impartial weighing of the contesting claims of individuals." On the contrary, Plato "is concerned solely with the collective whole," and justice for him is "nothing but the health, unity, and stability of the collective whole" (I, 106). Popper is unclear in this chapter about whether he regards Plato as having cynically misrepresented the humanitarian, conventionalist, social contractual egalitarian teaching as the equivalent of nihilism, or "whether we witness rather a tragic attempt to persuade his own better conscience of the evils of individualism" (I, 109). Judging from his references to how "dishonest" Plato was in portraying "the new humanitarian and individualist creed" as identical with nihilism and how Popper claims that Plato's theory of justice "is a conscious attempt to get the better of the egalitarian, individualist, and particularist tendencies of his time and to reinstate the claims of tribalism by developing a totalitarian moral theory" (I, 119), Popper clearly prefers the former interpretation.

Plato, although "strongly impressed by the new humanitarian morality, did not combat it with argument; he avoided even discussing it and sought to persuade those with humanitarian sentiments in the cause of the totalitarian class rule of a naturally superior master race" (I, 119). Class prerogatives "necessary for upholding the stability of the state constitute for him ... the essence of justice" (I, 119).

In the course of this chapter Popper has the opportunity to expound his own "protectionist" theory of justice as safeguarding the weak against the strong. In one place he applies the protectionist theory to the international scene, inveighing against political realists such as Hans Morgenthau (I, 260, n. 44) who questioned the feasibility of instituting a world government which will control "intera-
tional crime.” Popper holds that such an effective government is a problem of social engineering analogous to the maintenance of domestic civil peace and is not at all “utopian.” Consequently, scholars such as Morgenthaler who attack man’s ability rationally to construct such a scheme and make it effective are alleged to be romantic pessimists similar to Plato, Heraclitus, and Hobbes. “Let the state-worshippers continue to worship the state, but demand that the institutional technologists be allowed not only to improve its internal machinery, but also to build up an organization for the prevention of international crime.” (I, 113).

The remainder of Volume I (Chapters 7-10) contains primarily a reading of the Republic (supplemented occasionally with passages from the other dialogues) à la Popper. That is to say, Popper, having concluded that Plato is the most brilliant and influential enemy of the open society in history, proceeds to cite chapter and verse of his indictment. It will not be a concern of this study to go into the indictment in detail, but only to give the general outlines of Popper’s Plato. In the main, Popper holds that Plato led the revolt against the efforts of the “Great Generation,” which included Pericles, Socrates, and Protagoras—i.e., the generation before Plato himself—to establish a free society. The Great Generation had begun to lead Athens out of the shadows of the closed, magical, taboo-ridden past into the sunlight of rationality, equality, and personal responsibility. So powerful were the new enlightened ideas that Plato, in desiring to reverse this process and bring back the darkness of the tribal past, had to deceive people into thinking that he, as the leading student of Socrates, was supporting these ideas. Thus, he endowed terms such as justice, equality, democracy, reason, and even philosophy with a content the reverse of what they had in the works of the Great Generation. In doing this he deceived himself into thinking that his motives were benevolent. Again, however, there is ambiguity in Popper’s treatment of Plato’s motivations: how could so brilliant a man so thoroughly deceive himself about what he was doing? Plato, Popper contends, had concluded that the people could not stand the “strain of civilization” and the anxiety of making personal decisions without the guidance of tradition and of a ruling elite employing the arcana imperii. His fellow citizens, he concluded, would be happier if relieved of the burden of individualism. They needed to be integrated into a status or caste system which taught them their station and its duties.
Plato's philosophy sought to give them a theory of leadership that justified closing the door that had been opened. Freedom, in Plato's view, was too great a strain: its cultivation led to a society that was atomized, abstract, and impersonal. For Plato, the open society, being based on reason, left men devoid of faith in a religious system of meaning. Instead, they floundered in a sea of gray, lifeless abstractions and appeals that were merely intellectual. Human beings were above all creatures of passion; they needed myth and mystery, something they could believe in, a civil religion, an emotional faith.

Thus, Plato directed his readers' attention away from the practical questions of how to restrain the arbitrary use of power by rulers who may be corrupt or incompetent, to the enterprise of inspiring confidence in a new class of philosophic guardians. This new class—or caste—deserved to rule because of its wisdom, consisting of its access (through right education and upbringing) to the reality of the Forms and above all, the Idea of the Good. The philosophers could save us from the world of flux by contemplating the eternal forms that never changed. Using the Forms as a model, they could arrest the giddying wheel of change and bring our fallen, visible political world more closely in line with the "real" invisible world. The closer the approximation with reality, the less change would appear in our political life. The task of the philosopher was to produce a blueprint for the arresting of political change. Here is where the paradigm comes in: the true city laid up in the heavens.

All the institutional paraphernalia—the three class system, the "lordly [i.e., noble] lie," the censorship, the education in dialectic, the communism for the rulers, the militarism, the Inquisition, the civil religion—of the Republic, Statesman, and Laws—are directed toward preventing further political change once the paradigm is established. Plato mistakenly sought to deal with the real problems brought on by the sudden transition to democracy and the open society with "utopian social engineering." Plato was a utopian who wanted to "jettison reason, and to replace it by a desperate hope for political miracles." He was the thinker most responsible for the fateful influence of a tradition of "Romanticism" across the centuries: Romanticism seeks to replace the pragmatic, empirical, sensible, practical, reformist, progressive, rational, piecemeal approach of the open society with "dreams of a beautiful world." Romanticism may seek its heavenly city in the past or the future; it may preach
'back to nature' or 'forward to a world of love and beauty'; but its appeal is always to our emotions rather than to reason. Even with the best intentions of making heaven on earth, it only succeeds in making it a hell that hell which man alone prepares for his fellowmen." (I, 168). On this lugubrious note, Popper ends his interpretation of Plato.

Volume II: Hegel, Marx, and their "Aftermath"

Turning to the argument of the second volume, we shall pass over the brief section on Aristotle and concentrate on Hegel and Marx. First, however, let us recapitulate Popper's "rationalist" interpretation of the history of the centuries intervening between Plato and Hegel. While this history is riddled with "dark ages with their Platonizing authorities, their hierarchies of priests, and tribal orders of knights," there were some periods when the spirit of critical rationalism or ethical decisionism flourished. Let us, however, listen to Popper's explanation in his own words:

The rationalist interpretation of history [he observes tautologically] views with hope those periods in which man attempted to look upon human affairs rationally. It sees in the Great Generation and especially in Socrates, in early Christianity (down to Constantine), in the Renaissance and the period of the Enlightenment, and in modern science, parts of an often interrupted movement, the efforts of men to free themselves, to break out of the cage of the closed society, and to form an open society. It is aware that this movement does not represent a "law of progress" . . . but that it depends solely upon ourselves, and must disappear if we do not defend it against its antagonists as well as against laziness and indolence. This interpretation sees in the intervening period dark ages with their Platonizing authorities, their hierarchies of priests, and tribal orders of knights. (II, 303, n. 61)

In his brief sketch of four pages on the history of the open society's fortunes from Aristotle to Hegel, Popper makes some startling judgments. The Cynic school (Antisthenes and his followers) is given prominent place in such a history, and similarities between Cynicism and Christianity are alleged. We shall deal with these matters in the final section. Judaism is given an entirely negative evaluation as the equivalent of Platonism; ("early") Christianity is seen as a revolt against the closed thinking of Judaism analogous to the Cynic revolt against the closed unity of Platonism. Christianity, we are told was a "protest against Jewish tribalism, against
its rigid and empty tribal taboos, and against its tribal exclusiveness which expressed itself . . . in the doctrine of the chosen people, i.e., in an interpretation of the deity as a tribal god." (II, 22). Indeed, some of the comments about Jewish "ghetto life" and "tribalism" are so harsh as to make one think Popper antisemitic if one were not aware of his total rejection of such invidious discriminatory thinking. Popper is surely not opposed to Jews as people but to Jewish or to any other form of what he calls "tribalism." Still, some of his comments (e.g., II, 301, n. 56) sound insensitive, especially considering that they were presumably written while the Nazi Endlosung was taking place. That Popper has not taken the opportunity to revise these comments in later editions is surprising, to say the least.

Popper's praise of Christianity as a movement of openness is strictly limited to its early period; beginning with the Roman Emperor Constantine's acceptance of Christianity (for ulterior motives) in the 4th Century, the openness of Christianity was destroyed, Popper claims. The Church of the martyrs was replaced by the Church of the Popes, an institution based on pomp, venality, and power, which used its influence to defend inequality and unjust privilege. Institutional Christianity, therefore, entirely subverted the original aims of Christianity. Especially beginning with Justinian in the Sixth Century A.D. "the dark ages began. The Church followed in the wake of Platonic-Aristotelian totalitarianism, a development that culminated in the Inquisition" (II, 24).

HEGEL

Popper's attack on Hegel in Chapter 12 of The Open Society and Its Enemies has called forth more critical comment than any other section of the work, save the section on Plato. Given the tone of the chapter, strong reactions were inevitable, for Popper refused to take Hegel seriously, let alone as a great (if mistaken) philosopher. Popper labels Hegel a "charlatan" (II, 54); he and Fichte, his predecessor at Berlin, are called "clowns." (Ibid.) There are references to "Hegel's hysterical historicism" (II, 59) and to his having participated in a "conspiracy of noise" (II, 55). Hegel is declared to have "boldly set out to deceive and bewitch others" (II, 28). Popper is appalled that "the windbag Fichte and the charlatan Hegel are treated on a level with men like Democritus, Pascal, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant, J. S. Mill, and Bertrand Russell, and
that their moral teaching is taken seriously..." (II, 54-55). Throughout the chapter Popper quotes colorful denunciations of Hegel by Schopenhauer with enthusiastic approval. Popper relies heavily on Schopenhauer to support his conclusion that "Hegel's philosophy was inspired by ulterior motives," namely, to gain favor with the restored Prussian monarchy (II, 32).

In an addendum to the latest edition of his book, written 1961, eighteen years after the first edition, Popper acknowledges that his chapter on Hegel has been "much criticized" (II, 393). He repeats his conclusion that Hegel's "philosophical arguments are not to be taken seriously." He complains that the "admittedly partly playful" attack on Hegel's philosophy and the "scherzo-style of my Hegel chapter" (II, 394) were not seen for what they were: an attempt to "expose the ridiculous" in the work of a vastly overrated thinker.

Part of the difficulty for readers of the chapter on Hegel desirous of interpreting Popper's intent is the combination of ridicule and solemnity which the author employs in his characterization. For Hegel is not only ridiculed; he is taken with the utmost seriousness as the "missing link" between Plato and the "modern form of totalitarianism" (i.e. German National Socialism and Italian Fascism, both of which together Popper calls "fascism"). Presumably what Popper means for his readers to do is not to take Hegel seriously as a philosopher, but to take him in dead earnest as a protagonist of unparalleled pernicious influence on our practical lives. Schopenhauer is quoted approvingly for his conclusion that Hegel's "philosophy" was in the service not of truth but of self; it had become "a tool of interests; of state interests from above [i.e. Hegel as the philosopher of "Prussianism"], of personal interests from below.

In any event, Hegel's crucial historical role was to rediscover Platonic ideas in the first part of the nineteenth century just when it seemed that the French Revolution, having itself "rediscovered the perennial ideas of the Great Generation and of Christianity, freedom, equality, and the brotherhood of men," had inaugurated a new era of history for the practical implementation of the ideas of the open society (II, 30). Instead, Hegel helped bring about a "renaissance of tribalism." His own teaching may be called a "bombastic and hysterical Platonism" that led straight to the fascists' totalitarian dictatorships of the twentieth century.
Hegel, then, devoted his "borrowed thoughts and methods" to one aim: to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Friedrich William of Prussia. Hegel's confusion and debasement of reason," Popper continues,
is partly necessary as a means to an end, partly a more accidental but very natural expression of his state of mind. And the whole story of Hegel would not be worth relating, were it not for its more sinister consequences, which show how easily a clown may be a "maker of history." The tragi-comedy of the rise of "German Idealism," in spite of the hideous crimes to which it has led, resembles a comic opera much more than anything else; and these beginnings may help to explain why it is so hard to decide of its latter day heroes whether they have escaped from the stage of Wagner's Grand Teutonic Operas or from Offenbach's farces. (II, 32)

Thus Hegel, the philosophical clown, prepares the way for Hitler the political clown. [At least one assumes that the concluding lines in the above quotation refer to Hitler, Himmler, Goering, and the rest of the Nazi leadership; one of the peculiarities of Popper's study is that it nowhere mentions Hitler and the other Nazi leaders by name; references to National Socialism are always veiled and indirect.] Both clowns, it turns out, wore the mask of death.

As we might expect from someone who does not take his subject's philosophy seriously, Popper spends little time on Hegel's logic, his dialectic, his political philosophy, etc. It is sufficient to know that Hegel revives and perpetuates the "Essentialism" of Plato and Aristotle ["like Plato and Aristotle, Hegel conceives the essences, at least those of organisms (and therefore those of states) as souls or 'Spirits'] and that he refurbishes the "dialectic" of Heraclitus. The only significant change he makes in Platonism is to further Aristotle's revision by locating the essences in the stream of becoming. Interestingly, Popper finds Henri Bergson, the author of a very different theory of the open society, to have been inspired by Hegel in his theory of "creative evolution" (II, 37; also 307, n.25 and 315, n.66). Through his "philosophy of identity"—or showing that truth resides equally in the negation of a proposition so that only by their higher synthesis does reality manifest itself—Hegel absorbs and trivializes every criticism of power and thus nullifies the critical function of philosophy to speak truth to power.

The entire purpose of Hegel's philosophy of history, with its
movement of the World Spirit from the East to the West and from the South to the North [and specifically to the Germanic (Popper surprisingly sometimes mistranslates this the "German") World] was to justify and gain favor from the Prussian monarchy, which itself was expanding to create a unified German nation (II, 48 and passim).

Hegel's primary concern, Popper tells us, was to work toward the unification of German-speaking Europe, then divided into many independent and separate political units, into one politically consolidated German nation under an absolute monarchy "["the Germanic monarchy — of course is an absolute monarchy" (II, 48)]. As a leading figure in the rise of German nationalism, Hegel bears enormous responsibility for the "revolt against reason and the open society" that culminated in fascism. Hegel's nationalism is not to be confused with ordinary patriotism; it was an all-embracing religion that absorbed the entire person. Hegel's "blasphemous" statements about the State (meaning the Prussian "absolute monarchy") as "the Divine Idea on earth" and his identification of God's will and the success of the State "constitute a despicable perversion of everything that is decent; a perversion not only of reason, freedom, equality, and the other ideas of the open society, but also of a sincere belief in God, and even of a sincere patriotism." (II, 49).

Thus, modern nationalism, especially in its German form as represented by Hegel, "appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility which it attempts to replace by a collective or group responsibility." (Ibid.) The roots of this doctrine are in Plato and Aristotle, who "express decidedly nationalist views," for they wrote "to combat the open society and the new ideas of imperialism, cosmopolitanism, and equalitarianism" (II, 50). However, this early development of a nationalist political theory was halted by Alexander.

With Alexander's empire, genuine tribal nationalism disappears for ever from political practice, and for a long time from political theory. From Alexander onward, all the civilized states of Europe and Asia were empires, embracing populations of infinitely mixed origin. European civilization and all the political units belonging to it have remained international, or more precisely, inter-tribal ever since . . . And what holds good of [sic] political practice holds good of [sic] political theory; until about a hundred years ago, the Platonic-Aristotelian nationalism had practically disappeared from political doctrines. (II, 50)
Hegel's pernicious influence was also felt on Woodrow Wilson, who, although a "sincere democrat . . . fell victim to a movement that sprang from the most reactionary and servile political philosophy that had ever been imposed upon . . . mankind. He fell victim to his upbringing in the metaphysical political theories of Plato and Hegel, and to the nationalist movement based upon them." (II, 51). The outcome was Wilson's disastrous policy of national self-determination.

Strangely enough, before Hegel, modern nationalism was a "revolutionary and liberal creed. By something like an historical accident—the invasion of German lands by the first national army, the French army under Napoleon . . .—it made its way into the camp of freedom." (II, 51). Hegel, however, "brought nationalism back into the totalitarian camp where it had belonged . . ." since Plato (II, 51). Hegel "tamed nationalism" by stripping it of its liberal and democratic elements and "by transforming it into a well-disciplined Prussian authoritarianism" (II, 56).

HEGEL AND FASCISM

The remainder of Popper's Hegel chapter is devoted primarily to elaborating on his thesis that the German philosopher is the "missing link" between Plato and twentieth century fascist totalitarianism. He claims to show the "dependence" of key tenets of Nazi ideology on Hegel's political theory.

Thus, "the formula of the fascist brew is in all countries the same: Hegel plus a dash of nineteenth century materialism," especially Darwinism to back up claims to the survival of the fittest races. (Ibid.)

"The modern myth of Blood and Soil" is said to have its "exact counterpart" in Plato's myth of the metals (the story of the gold, silver and bronze "races" molded beneath the earth, introduced in the Republic). "Nevertheless, not 'Hegel and Plato,' but 'Hegel and Haeckel' [a nineteenth century precursor of Nazi racist "science"] is the formula of modern racialism. As we shall see, Marx replaced Hegel's 'Spirit' by matter . . . In the same way, racialism substitutes for Hegel's 'Spirit' . . . the quasi-biological conception of Blood or Race." (II, 61-62). This "transubstantiation" of Hegel's 'Spirit' into the "Blood" of Nazi racist "science" represents a difference of no great consequence between the two teachings. "Nearly all the more important ideas of modern totalitarianism are directly
inherited from Hegel, who collected and preserved . . . the ‘armory’ of weapons for totalitarian movements” (II, 62).

Popper finds six leading ideas in Hegel which, taken together with "Platonic totalitarianism and tribalism" and the "theory of the master and slave," make up the content of Nazi ideology. (1) Nationalism: “one chosen, nation” (or race) is "destined for world domination;" (2) War is the normal relationship among states (which are nations organized for action in history); (3) the state is "exempt from any . kind of moral obligation;" (4) total war is not only necessary but right or "ethical;" (5) the Great Man or leader is the moving force of history; (6) the "heroic life" is the best life for man, whose motto should be “live dangerously” (II, 62-63). In general, Hegel's conception of the state is "totalitarian" and "its might must permeate and control the whole life of the people in all its functions" (II, 63).

Popper concludes this chapter on Hegel with an urgent plea that other scholars and intellectuals recognize their obligation to help free mankind from the incubus of Hegelianism:

At least the new generation should be helped to free themselves from this intellectual fraud, the greatest, perhaps, in the history of civilization and its quarrels with its enemies. . . . The Hegelian farce has done enough harm. We must stop it. (II, 79)

MARX

After the unrelievedly denunciatory character of the sections on Plato and Hegel, it is almost a relief to come to the section on Marx. He speaks of Marx's undoubtedly "humanitarian" impulses and of his having made an "honest attempt to apply rational methods to the most urgent problems of social life." Then there follows this impressive tribute:

One cannot do justice to Marx without recognizing his sincerity. His open-mindedness, his sense of facts, his distrust of verbiage, and especially of moralizing verbiage, made him one of the world's most influential fighters against hypocrisy and pharisaism. He had a burning desire to help the oppressed, and was fully conscious of the need for proving himself in deeds, and not only in words. . . . His sincerity in his search for truth and his intellectual honesty distinguished him . . . from many of his followers . . . (II, 82)

Having delivered himself of this tribute, Popper then understandably raises the question “Why, then, attack Marx?” The
answer is that Marx "misled scores of intelligent people into believing that historical prophecy is the scientific way of approaching social problems." Marx is to be attacked precisely for his having made "the historicist method" appealing to "those who wish to advance the cause of the open society." (Ibid.)

Although Marx originally came to the social sciences with a "pragmatic" frame of mind interested in practical results for the improvement of the lot of the working class, he soon abandoned this approach in favor of historical determinism. Marx confused the roles of scientist and prophet, and mistakenly found the mode for social sciences in a (now outmoded) conception of the natural sciences which saw them as arriving at deterministic laws permitting them to make precise predictions.

Marx also erred in denouncing as "Utopianists" those who "looked upon social institutions with the eyes of a social engineer, holding them amenable to human reason and will, and to be a possible field of rational planning." (II, 86). In confining himself to grandiose prophecies of history's broad sweep, he left Lenin and the other leaders of the Russian Revolution "entirely unprepared for their great tasks [1] in the field of social engineering" (II 83).

Popper claims to take from Marx his "logic of social situations" and his understanding of the "unintended social repercussions of our actions." Thus, Popper insists that he has arrived at a hard-headed, non-idealistic liberal theory whose goal is the liberation of the individual, but which perceives the recognition of the extent of his often unconscious bondage to society as the necessary pre-conditions for that liberation. Popper in particular is opposed to any allegedly highbrow Platonizing or Hegelianizing talk of "ideas" and consciousness as being the determinant of society. Rather, the problem of social change is said to begin with the practical institutional setting in which the thinking man finds himself. It is, therefore, idle to talk of some kind of general change of consciousness as preceding the change of institutions. Achieving the open society is a concrete, practical task of social reform.

While praising Marx for his (not always consistent) attack on "psychologism," Popper condemns him, in Chapters 15-22, for the collectivist, determinist, and totalitarian character of his philosophy of history. That is, Marx did not rest content with having exposed the key social problems facing capitalism and with having
discovered the importance of the social system's corrupting effects on individual decisions, producing consequences unintended by those in power. Instead, he developed a grandiose, closed system of thought claiming to explain all of reality.

Marx is faulted for having developed his own brand of historicism: "economism." He rejected Hegel's idealistic and Mill's psychologistic forms of historicism (II, 104), but put his own "materialist" version in their place. However, Popper takes issue with simple-minded interpretations of Marxism as crudely materialistic, as denying the importance of man's mental life, as embracing a crude hedonism or reductionist materialism such as is implied in Feuerbach's famous play on words, *Der Mensch ist was er isst* ("Man is what he eats").

In this part of the work as elsewhere, Popper shows his impatience with philosophical questions concerning the source or origin of man, society, and history. Particularly in the social sciences, which deal with the "realm of man-made things," we must abandon the "naive" search for causes. Not "who has made it?" or "what is it made of?" but "who is going to use it?" and "what is it made for?" are the proper questions (II, 106).

Popper is particularly disturbed by what he calls Marx's view of the "impotence" of politics and of its subordination to economic laws. As he expresses his own theory:

A directly opposite view is implied in the position we have reached in our analysis. It considers political power as fundamental. Political power . . . can control economic power. This means an immense extension of the field of political activities. . . . We can, for instance, develop a rationalist political program for the protection of the economically weak. We can make laws to limit exploitation. We can limit the working day: but we can do much more. By law, we can insure the workers (or better still, all citizens) against disability, unemployment, and old age. . . . And when we are able by law to guarantee a livelihood to everybody willing to work, and there is no reason why we should not achieve that, then the protection of the freedom of the citizen from economic fear and economic intimidation will approach completeness. From this point of view, political power is the key to economic protection. Political power and its control is [sic] everything. . . . (II, 126)

Popper here sings fulsome praise indeed to the Keynesian theory in favor of government intervention in the economy as opposed to a policy of laissez-faire, or largely unrestrained capitalism. (Strangely enough, however, he nowhere mentions Keynes by
However, the last sentence reveals another ambivalence in Popper’s theory: “political power and its control” are said to be “everything.” Thus, a few pages later he adds the warning:

... [E]conomic intervention, even the piecemeal methods advocated here, will tend to increase the power of the state. Intervention is therefore extremely dangerous. This is not a decisive argument against it; state power must always remain a dangerous though necessary evil. But it should be a warning that if we relax our watchfulness, and if we do not strengthen our democratic institutions while giving more power to the state by interventionist “planning,” then we may lose our freedom. And if freedom is lost, everything is lost. . . . (II, 130)

After another “plea for piecemeal [as opposed to ‘Utopian’ or holistic] . . . social engineering,” and another warning about the necessity for fighting “current evils” rather than aiming at some “ideal good,” Popper concludes:

But it is not enough to say that our solution should be a minimum solution; that we should be watchful; and that we should not give more power to the state than is necessary for the protection of freedom. These remarks may raise problems, but they do not show a way to a solution. It is even conceivable that there is no solution; that the recognition of new economic powers by a state . . . will make it irresistible. (II, 130-131)

The solution on which Popper relies is that of “designing institutions for preventing even bad rules from doing too much damage.” Again, he insists on abjuring personal solutions (or reliance on a given political leader or group) in favor of reliance on “impersonal institutions” (II, 131). “Our” objective should be to design a “legal framework of protective institutions” in which laws establish general penalties for a class of abuses (child-labor, or regulating land use, for example) but leave as little as possible discretionary power to the civil servant who enforces them. Thus, intervention by the state occurs, but it is “institutional” and “indirect” rather than being “personal” or “direct” (II, 132). Popper concedes, however, that discretion must be allowed for short-term policy decisions as on the budget for a given year or a response to an immediate foreign policy problem. But all long-term governmental actions should be as institutionalized and as impersonal as possible.

Popper’s own position might be more accurately described as “institutionalized interventionism” rather than by his own term
of "piecemeal social engineering." He laments that the significance of the distinction between personal and discretionary and impersonal and institutionalized forms of intervention is "not understood." Here again, the pernicious influence of historicism makes itself felt, he insists, "The way to its understanding is blocked to the followers of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. They will never see that the old question 'Who shall be the rulers?' must be represented by the more real one 'How can we tame them?' " (II, 133).

It should be emphasized that, although he expresses concern about the dangers of dramatically increasing governmental power through an activist interventionist policy, Popper is totally confident that the dangers can be "mastered" by "social technology" and "social piecemeal engineering."

Karl Popper calls his discussion of what he describes as Marx's thesis regarding the "impotence of politics" to be the "crucial point in our analysis as well as in our criticism of Marxism" (II, 118). (By "Marxism" Popper usually means Marx's own thought rather than the movement inspired by his thought.) The remainder of this part of The Open Society and Its Enemies deals with "Marx's Prophecy" and "Marx's Ethics." The points made in these chapters are elaborations of the positions already set forth, or they have to do with more details of Marx's economic theories and so contain no surprises relating to the problem of the "open society."

Popper examines the argument of Das Kapital in terms of three "steps": (1) the analysis of capitalism and its class contradictions; (2) the assumption of the inevitability of a "social revolution"; and (3) the emergence of a classless society. Beginning in reverse with (3), he criticizes Marx for assuming that the revolution would produce a classless society; rather, within the "working class" that gained victory over the bourgeoisie, divisions would arise, and a "New Class: the new ruling class of the new society" is most likely to emerge (III1138). Popper also faults Marx for assuming only two alternatives--"unrestrained Capitalism" or Communism--thereby ignoring, among other possibilities, "democratic interventionism" as in the welfare state policies of England, the U.S., Sweden, etc. He also notes that Marx failed utterly to predict the emergence of "the fascist form of totalitarianism" (II, 140). In addition to questioning the validity of Marx's prediction of the elimination of all classes except the bourgeoisie and the proletariat under capitalism, Popper also attacks Marx for prophesying
(and therefore endorsing as legitimate) a possibly violent revolution and for insisting that it is the end (the classless society) rather than the means that is decisive. Political violence, Popper insists, should be carefully circumscribed and used only to overthrow an entrenched tyranny or to defend democratic institutions. It should never be used against democracy itself. Democracy permits reform without violence, safeguards the rights of the minority so that it may in time through persuasion hope to become the majority, and checks the potential abuse of power by well-designed institutional and legal limitations on the arbitrary use of power. Democracy is emphatically to be distinguished from tyranny, whether of the majority or minority. Democracy should be intolerant only of those who seek its forcible overthrow.

Popper finds Marx's analysis of capitalism itself faulty for its historicist assumption of an inevitable law of accumulation of capital in fewer and fewer hands and the increasing "polarization" of the proletariat. Through such acts of "democratic interventionism" as progressive taxation, unemployment, and health insurance, and antitrust legislation, the dire prophecies of Marx and Engels proved to be fallacious. Similarly, Marx's "brilliant" theory of "surplus" value; by which laborers are forced to accept starvation wages as their permanent lot thanks to the "reserve army" of the unemployed, proved invalid thanks to the development of the trade union movement, collective bargaining and the threat of strikes (II, 178). Once again, democratic interventionism works to circumvent or mitigate the effects of so-called "laws" of capitalist development.

Popper criticizes Marx for his "naive historicist optimism" and his belief in an inevitable "law of progress," which he is said to have shared with Hegel, Comte, and Mill. This optimism "is no less superstitious than a pessimistic historicism like that of Plato and Spengler." Progress, while possible, is not a "law of nature" (II, 197). Having raised this objection, however, Popper, as was the case with his concern that activist interventionism in the welfare state might lead to overconcentration and abuse of governmental power, dilutes the effect of his criticism. In fact, he emerges as quite an optimist himself, contending that by the use of our reason, "we may change the world" (II, 198).

"We" may "change the world" if we abandon the closed thinking of deterministic historicism and instead embrace the "humani-
tarian faith" of the "open society": a faith which, although in some sense "religious" in character, is mainly a "faith in reason." If these sentiments seem confusing, it should be recalled that Popper's epistemology, emphasizing the powerlessness of reason to prove its basic "faith" in reason itself to liberate mankind, does in fact combine an ultimately irrational "decision" to have faith in the capacity of human reason to change (improve) the world with the "empirical" method of trial and error where propositions in principle can be falsified by reference to "experience." Social scientists like natural scientists, if they are "critical rationalists" recognize "experience" as the "impartial arbiter of their controversies." Thus Popper continues:

When speaking of "experience" I have in view experience of a "public" character, like observations, and experiments, as opposed to experience in the sense of more "private" aesthetic or religious experience; and an experience is "public" if everybody who takes the trouble can repeat it. . . . [S]cientists try to express their theories in such a form that they can be tested, i.e., refuted (or else corroborated) by such experience. (II, 218)

The initial decision, then, to have "faith" in reason and in experimental methods is itself not subject to verification by "experience" of a public character: it is, rather, akin to a "religious" experience. It is "irrational" in that reasoned observation can neither confirm nor deny it.

Thus, if it had been viewed as a "faith" in the possibility of a better future for mankind, Marxism could have contributed to instead of militating against the open society. Instead, Marx sought to present his version of the "progress" idea as a scientific law. Therein he abandoned himself to "prophecy" and discouraged concern for "social technology" among his followers. If only the Marxists had been Popperians they might have succeeded instead of failing!

A thorough preparation for social engineering, for planning for freedom, on the part of the Russian Marxists as well as those in Central Europe, might possibly have led to an unmistakable success, convincing to all friends of the open society. But this would not have been a corroborration of a scientific prophecy [prediction?]. It would have been the result of a religious movement—the result of the faith in humanitarianism, combined with a critical use of our reason for the purpose of changing the world. (II, 198)

Unfortunately, however, the prophetic element in Marx pre-
vailed over the rational element (and over his humanitarian faith) "banishing the power of cool and critical judgment and destroying belief that by the use of reason we may change the world. All that remained of Marx's teaching was the oracular philosophy of Hegel, which in its Marxist trappings threatens to paralyze the struggle for the open society." (Ibid.)

Readers familiar with Marx's early writings, and especially with the *Philosophical-Economic Manuscripts*, of which Popper appears not to have been aware, will be surprised to find him stressing the passive, determinist side of Marx to such an extent. There is a brief reference to the *German Ideology*, and specifically to the *Theses on Feuerbach*, however, in Popper's final chapter on Marx. There he concedes that there are many "activist" passages in Marx about changing rather than interpreting the world and that he saw the future as resulting in man's liberation from the irrational forces currently determining his life. The problem, as Popper sees it, is that the activist tendencies in Marx "are counteracted by his historicism" (II, 201-202).

Marx's contribution, Popper concludes, was to have shown that the capitalist system in its unregulated form was unjust, and that it is our "responsibility" to reform the system rather than allowing unjust "institutions" to persist.

It is this moral radicalism of Marx which explains his influence; and that is a hopeful fact in itself. This moral radicalism is still alive. It is our task to keep it alive, to prevent it from going the way his political radicalism will have to go. "Scientific" Marxism is dead. Its feeling of social responsibility and its love for freedom must survive. (II, 211)

THE "AFTERMATH"

The final three chapters of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* are under the general heading "The Aftermath" (presumably of Hegel, Marx, and the "high tide of prophecy"). Chapter 23 consists of an attack on the "sociology of knowledge" (i.e., on Karl Mannheim and others). Chapter 24 is a lengthy denunciation of "oracular philosophy" and the "revolt against reason." Chapter 25, in addition to summing up the book's thesis, denounces what the author calls "theistic historicism."

Popper condemns the sociology of knowledge (whether represented in Marx or in Mannheim) as destroying "the basis of rational
discussion" and as leading to "anti-rationalism and mysticism" (II, 216). In opposition to the "passive" image of the mind as determined by impressions received from the environment, the scientific approach of critical rationalism sees the mind as an "active" instrument, selecting and arranging the sensations that bombard it and interpreting events in the light of criteria it imposes on them. Popper is impatient with claims that our reason is "tainted" as it were, by our position in the social structure, group interests and the like, and, in general, contends that the scientific method of trial and error and testing the results of policies with publicly accepted methodologies will counter the tendency to partiality in the investigators themselves. We should frankly recognize in a general sense, the role of practical objectives in scholarly work in the social sciences; however, the social sciences do not differ fundamentally from the natural sciences in being practically motivated. In any event, there is nothing wrong with a practical undertaking:

No scientist can know without making an effort, without taking an interest; and in this effort there is usually even a certain amount of self-interest involved. The engineer studies things mainly from a practical point of view. So does the farmer. Practice is not the enemy of theoretical knowledge but the most valuable incentive to it. (II, 222)

Indeed, practice for Popper, just as for Marx, is the final test of theory. "Reality" consists of the "practical application of our findings." If we lose touch "with reality, [i.e.] with practice" we will be "l lapsing into scholasticism." "Practical application of our findings is thus the means by which we may eliminate irrationalism from the social sciences, and not any attempt to separate knowledge from 'will' " (II, 222).

Chapter 24 on the "revolt against reason" is directed primarily against assorted "romantics" and "irrationalists," principally in the twentieth century, including Bergson (II, 229), Alfred North Whitehead, and Arnold Toynbee (II, 247 ff.). In the process, Popper elaborates on his understanding of "reason" and "rationalism." He is at pains to disassociate himself from the equation of rationalism with "intellectualism" (in the sense of the abstract, "a priori teachings of some eighteenth century writers against whom Edmund Burke properly inveighed). Such "intellectualists," with wildly exaggerated claims for what reason can accomplish, extol intelligence "above observation and experiment" (II, 224).
For Popper, rationalism is "critical rationalism;" it makes use of "experiment as well as thought;" it is both intellectual and "empirical." Rationalism in the true sense, furthermore, seeks to solve problems by appealing to "clear thought and experience," rather than to "emotions and passions" (II, 224). Rationalism can best be defined "in terms of practical attitudes or behavior." In that sense, rationalism is "an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience" (II, 225). The "rationalist attitude" is "very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need cooperation, and that, with the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity" (ibid.).

Popper sees himself in the role of defender of the rationalist faith in our time against the incursions of the "oracular irrationalism" of "Bergson and the majority of German philosophers and intellectuals" (II, 229). Hitherto, the irrationalists have had a field day against the "uncritical rationalism" of some writers. Popper's task, then, is to establish the position of "critical rationalism."

Against the "comprehensive" or "uncritical" rationalists, such as the logical positivists who insist on discarding as "meaningless" any synthetic proposition that cannot be defended by means of argument or experience, Popper argues for the necessity of an "irrational faith in reason" as the basis for the rationalist attitude itself. Only those who "are ready to consider argument and experience will be impressed by the results (II, 230-231)."

Does the concession of the necessity for "faith in reason"-itself unprovable by reason-as the basis of a rationalist theory of man and society mean for Popper that "we are all irrationalists now?" By no means. This concession, although important, leaves an enormous gulf between the (critical) rationalist and the irrationalist. Whether intentionally or not, by elevating "emotion and passion" above reason, the irrationalist endorses "what I can only describe as crime." By scorning reason and resigning himself to the "irrational nature of human beings" the irrationalist is left with "an appeal to violence and brutal force as the ultimate arbitrator in any dispute." This is because the very fact of a dispute means that the constructive or cooperative passions were insufficient to resolve the problem; there is then nothing left for the irrationalist except the appeal to other and less constructive emotions and passions, to fear, hatred, envy, and ultimately, to violence? (II, 234).
Irrationalism is no mere speculative fallacy but allegedly has "criminal" consequences. When applied to the realm of governmental power, "it offers a justification of the attitude that different categories of people have different rights; that the master has the right to enslave the slave; that some men have the right to use others as their tools. Ultimately, it will be used, as in Plato, to justify murder." (II, 236).

Popper insists on a wall of separation between the public and private realms. Using public political power "we" have only the negative duty to help alleviate suffering. We have no positive duty to promote the happiness of our fellow citizens, to offer them spiritual guidance, or to help them cultivate their aesthetic sensibilities. We may, it is true, attempt to "impose our scale of values—our preferences regarding music, for example" on our friends, but "only if, and because, they can get rid of us" (II, 237). Political coercion is an entirely different matter.

Rationalism—"critical" rationalism, that is—enjoins "tolerance, of at least all those who are not intolerant themselves" (II, 238). Popper here refers the reader to an earlier passage where he discusses the "paradox of tolerance." "Unlimited tolerance" cannot be defended for it "must lead to the disappearance of tolerance." Therefore in a "tolerant society" tolerance, even in the realm of speech, may be restricted:

In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force. . . . We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal. . . . (I, 265, n. 4)

The final section of The Open Society and Its Enemies is devoted to an attack on what Popper calls "mysticism." There is a particular breed of irrationalist who thinks his subtle tastes are superior to our "scientific age" with "its brainless division of labor," and its vulgar "materialization" of all life. Such a critic; who "looks out for the latest esoteric intellectual fashion, which he discovers in the admiration of medieval mysticism" is an enemy of the open
The contemporary "mystic" is "incapable of appreciating the moral forces inherent in modern science" (II, 240-241).

The nineteenth century conflict between science and religion having been superseded, the choice with which "we" are confronted "is not between knowledge and faith but between "two types of faith": i.e., between "a faith in reason and in human individuals and a faith in the mystical faculties of man by which he is united to a collective." This is also a choice between "an attitude that recognizes the unity of mankind [earlier rejected as a holistic abstraction!] and an attitude that divides men into friends and foes, into masters and slaves" (ibid.).

The final chapter of Popper's work is entitled "Has History Any Meaning?" His answer to that question may be summarized as follows: "None but what we give to it." Considered as a whole, there is no such thing as "history" in the "objective" sense; rather, there are public events which are variously interpreted. In fact, "each generation has a right to look upon and reinterpret history in its own way..." In fact, each generation has a duty to do so. "We want to know how our troubles are related to the past, and we want to see the line along which we may progress towards the solution of what we feel, and what we choose, to be our main tasks."

The "historicist" view of history—as a process outside of us which moves us along in a certain direction—is both empirically untenable and morally pernicious, Popper insists. A valid theory of history is based on the "searchlight" theory of historical knowledge: we decide on the areas of the past where we will shine the searchlight. "We let it play upon our past, and we hope to illuminate the present by its reflection. As opposed to this, the historicist interpretation may be compared to a searchlight which we direct upon, ourselves." (II, 268-269). Blinded by the searchlight we are unable to see anything. "To translate this metaphor, the historicist does not recognize that it is we who select and order the facts of history, but he believes that 'history itself'... determines, by its own inherent laws, ourselves, our problems, our future, and even our point of view. Historicism is out to find The Path on which mankind is destined to walk; it is out to discover The Clue to History..." (II, 269).

Popper's view of history is strongly affected by his decisionist
ethics and his dualism, or separation of fact and value, nature, and convention. Again and again he insists that man is thrown back on himself. He is saved from a radical solipsism, in which each lonely individual makes his separate decision, by his recognition of the importance of tradition and the social context. Individuals must decide, yet they have the help of other like-minded, rationally inclined individuals in the present and in the past (the tradition of rational criticism and the "open society") in reaching their decisions and in cooperating to have them put into effect.

Still, we must recognize that "`history' in the sense in which most people speak of it simply does not exist" (II, 269 italics in original). For "most people," who "learn about it in school and at the University," history is "a more or less definite series of facts" which, they believe, constitute the "history of mankind" (ibid.). In truth, they are not talking about the history of mankind at all, but of the "'history' of political power" (II, 270).

Popper states flatly that there "is no history of mankind"; there is "only an indefinite number of histories of all kinds of aspects of human life." He is insistent on this point, adding that such "must be the reply of every humanitarian . . . and especially every Christian. A concrete history of mankind, if there were any, would have to be the history of all men. . . . For there is no one man more important than any other." Such a history, however, "cannot be written," because the historian must "make abstractions," and select some aspects and neglect others (II, 270).

In this final chapter, Popper's seemingly ambivalent attitude toward Christianity again comes to the fore. In quoting extensively from Kierkegaard and Karl Barth (II, 272-275), Popper almost seems to embrace a neo-orthodox Protestant orientation. He speaks with the ire of one who feels his commitment betrayed in denouncing the "blasphemy" of historicists who see history as the "march of God in the world," to use Hegel's much debated phrase. "To maintain that God reveals Himself in what is usually called 'history'"—i.e., in the "history of international crime and of mass murder"—is "indeed • blasphemy" (II, 271-272). The theistic historicist worships power and success. He is indifferent to the life of the "unknown individual man" and his sorrows and joys. "If that could be told by history," writes Popper "then I should certainly not say that it • blasphemy to see the finger of God in it. But such a history does not and cannot exist; and all the history which
exists, our history of the Great and the Powerful, is at best a shallow comedy . . ." (II, 272).

Popper concludes this final chapter with an emphatic answer to the question of whether history has meaning: "although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning." Here he repeats his principles of critical dualism: "Neither nature nor history can tell us what we ought to do . . . It is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and into history. "We" can decide to "fight for equal rights," to make political and other institutions and ourselves and our language, "more rational." We can make the "history of power politics . . . our fight for the open society and against its enemies (who, when in a corner, always protest their humanitarian sentiments in accordance with Pareto's advice). . . ." (II, 278).

The all-important principle which Popper reiterates in concluding this magnum opus is the "dualism of facts and decisions." "Facts, whether those of nature or those of history, cannot make the decision for us, they cannot determine the ends we are going to choose" (II, 278).

One of Popper's most curious criticisms of the "irrationalists" is that those who stress love or emotion rather than reason inevitably end by dividing mankind into two parts: "into friend and foe, into those who belong to our tribe, to our emotional community, and those who stand outside it; into believers and unbelievers (II, 235). He also attacks the "method" of A. N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality* for allegedly dividing mankind "into two parts, a small number of the elect, and a large number of the lost" (II, 250). And yet, the very title of Popper's own work speaks of the "enemies" of the open society, and he clearly has a long list of "enemies" from Heraclitus to Hegel and Husserl whom he discusses in the book. To say that Bergson and Whitehead exclude great numbers of human beings from their emotional "tribe" because they are narrow "rationalists" is no more valid than to say that Popper excludes all those swayed by "emotion."

POPPER'S EPILOGUE

In 1961, Popper wrote an epilogue, or series of addenda, to Volume II of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. These remarks are written in a calmer tone than the white heat (ironically, for one who deplores emotion) of some passages in the work itself. He begins the epilogue with an account of his theory of knowl-
edge, in which he seeks to distinguish his own position from that of authoritarianism, "absolutism," "dogmatism," and natural law (they are apparently all the same) on the one hand and relativism on the other. His own position is called "fallibilism" which he defines as "the view, or the acceptance of the fact that we may err, and that a quest for certainty (or even the quest for high probability) is a mistaken quest" (II, 375). In the place of the quest for certainty we must put the "quest for truth." For, "even though we may find truth (as I believe we do in very many cases), we can never be quite certain that we have found it. There is always a possibility of error." (Ibid.).

Popper is eager to move away from the narrow epistemology of Rudolf Carnap and others in the Vienna Circle who insisted that propositions purporting to illumine the nature of reality which were not capable of verification in sensory experience were "meaningless." Instead, Popper admits to numerous "sources of knowledge including tradition, reason, imagination, (and) observation;" all of these sources "may be used, but none has any authority" (II, 378). This approach throws the "decision" on which sources are to be used and in what combination back on the (irrational) decision of the individual himself.

Popper advocates "openness to criticism" as the cure for all types of dogmatism," both irrationalist and rationalist. He rejects the logical positivist appeal to sense experience as the only criterion of the truth or falsehood of statements or propositions, because there "simply is no such thing as pure experimental and observational experience." Experience does not consist of pure data but of "a web of guesses-of conjectures, expectations, hypotheses," interwoven with accepted traditions, both scientific and unscientific (II, 388).

Popper remains, therefore, to the last a fideist; that is, his entire teaching rests on a faith or pre-rational decision in favor of what he understands to be "reason." It is this "critical rationalism" which is the basis for the open society. The expectations of what human beings can achieve in such a society should be sober and cautious. As a society we should pursue the general goal (although it is not the only goal and cannot be reduced to a Benthamistic calculus) of "minimizing misery." As for maximizing happiness (Bentham's aim of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number"), we should leave that to the private endeavor of each of us (II, 386).
Concluding Critical Observations: or Reflections on the Poverty of Popperism

In the following remarks I shall on the whole abjure going into detail regarding Popper's interpretations of particular thinkers and schools, both because as was mentioned in footnote 6, excellent scholarly works already exist which either explicitly or implicitly correct the record with reference especially to Plato and Hegel and because in my judgment Popper's most significant errors have to do with his faulty conception of openness and of the open society.

In general, Popper's arbitrary reading of the history of political and social ideas is the result of his misunderstanding of the principal modes of openness that have emerged in history (yes, in history, so misconceived and maligned by Popper). These mistakes are in turn related to his idiosyncratic concept of experience, which in turn flows from his highly abstract view of the self and its relationship to the reality in which it participates. Despite apparent concessions to the fact that man exists within society and history rather than at some Archimedean point outside of them, Popper ultimately falls back on the liberal individualist concept, as found in Hobbes and Locke, wherein the atomistic individual, enclosed in his private world, is conceived of as facing an alien environment. This approach was appropriately criticized by Hegel (yes, by Hegel!) with reference to a certain type of Enlightenment thinking, as the perspective of the "Understanding" (Verstand). Experience, then, for Popper, is essentially private, and the categories and norms of political and social thought in particular are imposed on the facts from the outside by the individual consciousness. If we are alive to this fact, he contends, we are then able consciously to choose the perspective or school of thought with which we identify, and if we are "open" we will elect to be among the liberal individualists, critical dualists and critical rationalists—that is, the followers of Popper—who make up and support the "open society."

For Popper, then, there is no public or common world of the intellect and spirit-or realm of non-metric reality—and, accordingly, no generally available languages or symbolic forms which illumine the non-metric realm from within. The modes of openness which historically differentiated themselves, then, become arbitrary and irrational constructions. (1) Myth becomes for Popper an attempt to rationalize the irrational and the "hysterical refusal to carry the cross of civilization," (II, 245) instead of the
original, relatively undifferentiated language of openness toward reality on all its dimensions. (2) Philosophy, instead of being understood as the momentous "break with the myth" begun by the pre-Socratic Ionian thinkers and continued by Plato to the point of differentiating the world-transcendent divine ground from the undifferentiated intra-cosmic reality symbolized in the myth, becomes synonymous with Popper's own "critical rationalism" and the anticipations of it he espies in various thinkers across the centuries. (3) Revelation, instead of being apprehended as the manifestation of the world-transcendent divine ground through the unprecedented and unrepeatable descent of God to man in a particular theophany as in Moses and the Burning Bush or Paul on the road to Damascus—a theophany which illumines the process of reality as a movement toward eschatological fulfillment beyond time and the world—is dismissed by Popper as a manifestation of irrationality, tribalism, parochialism, and anti-egalitarianism. As mentioned above, Popper's account of Judaism is astonishingly unsympathetic. Not even the prophets are treated as defenders of the open society. Instead, Judaism, and the Hebrew Scriptures are described with such alien and inappropriate terms as "Jewish Platonism" and "Jewish tribalism" with its "rigid and empty taboos" and its "tribal inclusiveness" which expressed itself... in the doctrine of the chosen people, i.e., in the interpretation of the deity as a tribal god" (II, 22): Early Christianity is exempted from Popper's attack only because of its "humanitarian components allegedly resembling those of the sophists and the Cynics [H] in Greece (ibid.). Finally, (4) Mysticism, instead of being regarded as the language of silence in which the unutterable, ineffable divine ground is nonetheless symbolized in the passionate imagery of the experience of meditative transport, is dismissed by Popper as the sublimation of a merely private eroticism and as the antithesis of real, universally communicable experience.

By now we are approaching the root cause of what might be termed the poverty of Popperism: its deliberately unhistorical approach. Popper is so incensed at what he calls historicism, or the alleged discovery of universal laws allowing one to predict the future, that he allows this legitimate criticism to engender a hostility to history itself, here conceived of as the enterprise of trying to see events in the way that the participants themselves may have envisaged them. Thus, as G. E. K. has pointed out, Popper's
forced interpretations of Heraclitus and the pre-Socratics generally, for example, display greater interest in "what an ancient thinker evokes" in us today and in what he "might have been or thought" in terms of our own parochial schemes and typologies than in "what he actually was or thought." Although ostensibly the enemy of historicism, Popper actually "applies a kind of historicism in reverse: instead of using the past to predict the future he uses the present, or his idea of what constitutes philosophy, to interpret the past."7

Of course, Popper can reply that every historian has a theory, that it is naive to view historical reality as if it were "out there" to be photographed, that interpretation by the historian inevitably enters into the selection and the evaluation of events. What he overlooks, however, is the enormous progress which has been made by scholars in the critical study of the relevant texts and in situating texts in the general cultural context from which they emerged. Popper is anything but "open" in his approach to the ancient writers, refusing to consider the latest scholarship and textual matters because they allegedly concern only the specialist.8 Popper's own assumption of an abstract, atomistic, self-conscious self facing a body of data waiting to be endowed with meaning by the observer leads, him to impose his own pattern of meaning on events, and, to escape an unbearable and irrelevant solipsism, to seek out a group of allegedly like-minded individuals who have shared his priorities and world-view—a group which he calls the "open society." This so-called "open society" is actually open primarily to Popper's arbitrary reading of the texts.

No attempt is made by the author of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* to get inside, say, the mind of Plato and to explicate the meanings of the texts. Instead, only the most unsympathetic readings of the passages singled out are given and, although the dialogues are deliberately written in a style of indirection and partake of some of the playfulness of poetry, they are interpreted in a literalistic and fundamentalist fashion.9

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8 See ibid., p. 162, for Kirk's discussion of Popper's "amusing pose of the amateur."  
9 See Peter Weber-Schaefler, *Einführung in die antike Politische Theorie* (2 vols., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), p. 5. From the perspec-
Instead of being open-in the sense of being receptive-to the language of the document and to the attempt meditatively to re-create the experience giving rise to that language in oneself, Popper adopts the attitude of the witch-hunter mercilessly tracking down "every idle word" which offends his own private scheme of the way he wishes history to be.

Not surprisingly, then, Popper's accounts of thinking and schools of thought are riddled with arbitrariness. His contention that Plato, on whose dialogues most of our knowledge of Socrates depends, deliberately set out to subvert the teaching of the Master casting a "spell" over his readers so that they would not be aware of what was happening is as arbitrary and unsupportable as his contention that all the evil practices of Western politics, from the Inquisition to modern totalitarianism are similarly the result of this magic "spell" of Plato (with the help of Hegel, who provides the "missing link").

Another particularly egregious example of Popper's arbitrariness has to do with his treatment of the Cynics. The Cynics are allegedly among the "good guys" who preached the brotherhood of man and the open society against the tribalism of Plato and Aristotle. No mention is made of the centrality of the Cynic principle that the wise man always follows "nature" rather than convention and that in their peculiar judgment nature is indifferent to such practices as incest, cannibalism, and public masturbation. Leaving aside the sensationalist Bohemianism of the Cynics, which earned them their name of "dogs," what about Popper's claim that they promoted the "brotherhood of man" and may have directly inspired the early Christians in their preaching of a similar sentiment of brotherly love under the fatherhood of God? In fact, few schools of thought have taught such unbrotherly sentiments as the Cynics. So emphatic was their distinction between wise men and fools that they regarded the "fools"-who comprised the overwhelming majority of the human race-not to be men at all. Only the "free" Cynic wise man was a true human being; everybody
else was a "slave" to stupid traditions and contemptible customs.  
So much, at any rate, for the Cynic "brotherhood of man"; as for the "fatherhood of God," it would be a feat of extraordinary discernment to espy a personal god in the materialized "nature" which served as the standard for the conduct of the Cynic "sage." The only god the Cynics actually appear to have acknowledged was their own ego and its unjustified intellectual arrogance.

It would be easy to become bogged down in the details of Popper's allegations about various thinkers and schools. The intention of the present study, however, is to discuss Popper's theory of the open society, and so the principal question I wish to raise is not "Where did Popper go wrong in his interpretation of specific thinkers and schools?" but "What are the strengths and weaknesses of his theory of the open society?" I should like very much to be able to answer this question, but I regret that I have to conclude that Popper has no critical theory of the open society at all. Instead, Popper offers the open society concept as an intellectual justification for the institutions and practices of the western liberal democracies. (Perhaps this is an example of naive monism?) Popper cannot articulate a theory of the open society, because he is intent upon his practical task of defending the western democracies against attack. (Given his absorption of theory into practice, this attitude is not surprising.) However admirable was this goal and however valuable his book is as a statement of faith in liberal democratic institutions, the book has almost nothing to do with the problem of the modes of openness and the pressures for closure in the life of the spirit, just as it has almost nothing to do with mankind conceived of as an "open society."

Whatever the shortcomings of his presentation, Henri Bergson, in his *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932 and 1935) had established the open society as a symbol designating humankind as a universal community of the spirit. It was not a symbol designed to refer to a concrete society at all. It was a phrase designed to lift our sights from our immediate problems in our particular societies organized for action in time and the world to the plane of the universal in the human condition as such. The inner experience of existing in tension toward the divine ground of being, conveyed in the great theophanic events of philosophy and reve-

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tion, illumined the character of the human condition as a process in the Between (Metaxy). Openness to reality in all its dimensions means openness to the human existence as a condition of tension between the "noetic height" and the "cosmic depth," between the divine Beginning and the divine Beyond (Eric Voegelin).

Popper could not be receptive to the universal community of mankind across time and space, open to the flux of the divine presence in the cave drawings of Altamira, and in the philosophy of perhaps most of the thinkers rejected in his book. Indeed, he declared flatly that "(t)here is no history of mankind" but only "an indefinite number of histories of all aspects of human life." There can be no "concrete history of mankind" because if there were any, it would have to be a "history of all (individual) men. . . . For there is no one man more important than any other . . . (I, 270). This contention was repeated in another work by Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, where he declared that it is a "mistake to believe that there can be a history in the holistic sense." "Mankind" is not a reality but an abstraction, and there is no "comprehensive stream" of human development (The Poverty of Historicism (London: 1957), p. 81).

Thus, Popper atomizes history, just as he atomizes the concrete politically organized society. For him, the only reality is the lonely individual facing "reality" from the outside. Popper illicitly transfers the orientation of man from metric or phenomenal reality-the world of objects-to the sphere of non-metric reality-the world of participative consciousness. Non-metric reality then becomes another object to be dominated, conquered, and controlled rather than the source of our own personal order of the spirit.

Popper's liberal Pelagianism leads him to a naively uncomplicated view of what is to be done in practical politics. There he states the goal of "minimizing suffering" as the chief end of government. However admirable is Popper's concern for the underprivileged, he gives no thought to the entire problem of helping to improve the quality of life in a given society or even what the concept of the quality of life entails. This is because such a concept assumes the reality of the public realm and of the self's connectedness to the concrete community of which it is a part.

In a review of the second edition of Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, Alfred Cobban showed the inadequacy of Popper's goal of "minimizing suffering" in the following comment:
It is always a good thing, I think, to see what principles mean in practice, if only as a test of the firmness with which we hold them. Let me take another of Professor Popper’s theories of the way in which the open society should function. He is rightly suspicious of efforts to make people happy by state action. “It leads invariably to the attempt to impress our scale of ‘higher values’ upon others, in order to make them realize what seems to us of greatest importance for their happiness; in order, as it were, to save their souls.” (II, 337) He proposes, therefore, to replace the principle “maximize pleasure” by that of “minimize pain.” (II, 304; cf., I, 284-285) This principle may be tested by a positive example. I suppose that any government in Great Britain, faced with the necessity to make a decision whether to declare war on Germany or not in 1939, on the principle of minimizing pain should have remained at peace. On any reasonable calculation the human suffering likely to result from the war surely far outweighed any that was likely to be prevented by it. The consideration that war might possibly, though I should have thought hardly probable in the circumstances of 1939, minimize the calculable suffering in the long run is ruled out by an argument which Professor Popper employs elsewhere. Some Marxists believe that there would be less suffering involved in a violent social revolution than is inherent already under the capitalist system. “But how can they evaluate the suffering in the one state and in the other? Here, a factual question arises, and it is our duty not to overestimate our factual knowledge. . . . Can we condemn one generation to suffer for the sake of later generations?” (I, 287) These are very strong arguments, but I am left with an uneasy feeling that they would have added up to the wrong answer in 1939, and that therefore “minimize pain” is by itself not invariably a safe principle.

Much of what Popper says in opposition to totalitarianism and “utopian” thinking is unexceptionable. He has a good sense of the limits of what government and the legal system can accomplish. However, by refusing to suggest an alternative vision of the good life to animate a society in the place of the bogus metastatic constructions of the ideologies, he leaves a vacuum that can be filled by the very doctrines he detests. He is the enemy, of enthusiasm and passion, not recognizing that reason cannot be cut off from the emotions any more than can the individual from the community. Indeed, in his general discussions of the meaning of “reason,” it is clear that he comes close to what Rollo May (in Love and Will) would call a “schizoid” and repressive view of the passions.

Despite his frequent criticisms of the “conspiracy theories,” (such as the Nazi use of the Jews and the Communists’ use of the capitalists as scapegoats), Popper’s entire Open Society and Its
Enemies is essentially an account of an alleged "conspiracy" (by Plato, Hegel, and their present-day successors) to defend the closed society. Thus, he is led to reject whole cultures and societies as "closed" because they were based on "myth" or "mysticism" or whatever, even though within the world of the myth there are countless stories involving the criticism of the abuse of power, just as he neglects the entire prophetic tradition in Judaism. Popper would clearly be incapable of appreciating the openness and cultural richness of the wayang kulit or, shadow puppet theater in Indonesia, for instance, even though it is alive to the tension of existence in the Between of human life and the dangers of self-glorification and the abuse of power by rulers.

Similarly, Popper gives no credit to Plato and Aristotle for condemning tyranny and recognizing the crucial importance of inner moral restraint through the orientation toward the divine measure by the philosophos or spoudaios as the precondition for right conduct.

Instead, Popper arbitrarily condemns any recognition of moral norms rooted in the experience of personal participation in non-metric reality by insisting on the primacy of the self-contained individual "decision" as the basis for ethical judgment. The Measure does not judge man, but man imposes his own Procrustean measure, it seems.

Karl Popper claims to be open, but in his writing he is closed to most of reality outside the world of the pragmatic, secular-liberal humanist; closed to myth, to philosophy in its original Platonic sense, to revelation as the self-disclosure of the divine through the "flash of eternity into time," closed to mystical experience, closed in summary to non-metric reality in any intersubjective, meditatively communicable sense of the term, he is incapable of providing a theory of openness and the open society.

In summary, Popper's theory of the open society flunks the test of openness to experience in all its dimensions. His theory—his doctrine—is parochial both as to time (for him, the open society really began only three centuries ago) and to space (only Western civilization is even considered as a harbinger of openness). Karl Popper's view of archaic and pre-philosophical societies as shackled

11 See Benedict O. Anderson, Tolerance and the Mythology of the Javanese (Cornell University Monograph Series, 1965), an important monograph on the political implications of the wayang kulit.
to totemism and taboo and as based on a denial of any distinction between justice and power seems to be the result both of ignorance of the materials available on such societies and of his *a priori* judgment that because they were not dominated by the "rational," scientific attitude such societies could only be "closed."

Indeed, Popper’s usage of the closed society idea is so indiscriminate as to argue for abandoning it altogether. With Popper, the closed society is an undifferentiated dumping-ground for all societies except the ones informed by secular liberalism. In particular, there is in Popper no recognition of the uniqueness of twentieth-century totalitarianism and the importance of the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian. "Closed society" as a term meant to apply to a particular political community is inadequate, for as a term, it is too passive to capture the demonic dynamism of totalitarianism and too monolithic to capture the flavor of existence in an "authoritarian" (pre- or non-democratic) regime.

Popper’s equally amorphous use of the term "historicism" is likewise to be deplored. What can we make of a concept that allows one to lump together Nazi ideology and the Hebrew scriptures, both of which, according to Popper, are manifestations of "historicism"? The same can be said of his arbitrary reading of Heraclitus and of Augustine and Toynbee. If any attempt to find meaning in history represents a capitulation to closure, then Popper’s own work deserves to be cast upon the rubbish heap, for he certainly claims to discern a "progressivist" meaning to "history" as seen from the viewpoint of the "enlightened" rationalist. Only by caricaturing all the great philosophers of history as crude determinists or positivists could his own characterization of them hold true. For Plato, the *Bible*, St. Augustine, and Toynbee, there is no such thing as a determinist pattern of history to which they have discovered the key. On the contrary, ultimately, and despite occasional lapses of language, history for them opens out into the unknown future and, as with all human existence itself, its meaning is shrouded in mystery.

But enough. Even if Popper has done little to show the way to an adequate theory of the open society, at least he has rendered a service by producing in such elaborate detail a work which is in many crucial respects the antithesis of what such a theory would have to resemble. He at least exhibits the secular liberals’ acceptance of discussion, even if he sets the rules for adjudicating the discus-
sion in an arbitrary way. Popper is not a positivist, but he does appear to restrict "experience" so severely that it cannot be called on to validate the fundamental principle upon which his whole theory of the open society rests. As he puts it:

The rationalist attitude is characterized by the importance it attaches to argument and experience. But neither logical argument nor experience can establish the rational attitude; for only those who are ready to consider argument and experience... will be impressed by them. That is to say, a rational attitude must be first adopted if any argument or experience is to be effective, and it therefore cannot be based upon argument or experience... We have to conclude... that no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude. Thus a comprehensive rationalism is untenable. (II.230)

Popper does not view reason in the classical sense as the noetic illumination of personal existence in the Between or philosophy as the encounter of the two noetic entities, the human and the divine, in the Between of human life. Reason is confined largely to its technical and instrumental signification (indeed, Popper denies the very distinctions between a "higher" and "lower" or a contemplative and a pragmatic reason). As a result, he is left with the incongruity of an irrational basis of a "rationalist" ethic. Whoever adopts the rational attitude," he has written, does so on an "irrational basis," because "he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or doctrine, or belief, or behavior." This adoption should be described as an "irrational faith in reason" (II.231).

The arbitrariness of Popper's fundamental principles has immense consequences for the subject of openness and closure in the person and in society. It means that his society is truly open only to those who join his cultural circle and who uncritically and irrationally accept the tenets of his narrow so-called "critical rationalism." It means that the use of "we" employed throughout his book takes on an insidious, threatening tone for all who are not of the charmed community. Thus, "we" can do a whole list of things including narrowly specifying the types of publicity for elections down to a requirement standardizing the "size, type, etc. of the electioneering pamphlets" and eliminating placards (I, 231, m 27). More importantly, "we" can decide that there should be an "universal extension of the field of political activities." In the name of controlling economic power and guaranteeing nearly complete freedom
from "economic fear and intimidation," Popper sanctions a dangerous extension of the interventionist state. "Political power and its control, we are told, is everything." Its "control" will be adequate if it is in the hands of the "critical rationalists" (II, 126).

Karl Popper's model society is closed to the experiences of transcendent being in the modes of openness of myth, philosophy, revelation, and mysticism. His "openness" would better be renamed. A major task of the present generation of political theorists is to offer a more adequate theory of openness and of the open society, building on the insights of Henri Bergson and Eric Voegelin, insights which in turn are derived from the whole range of symbols available from the history of language and culture in many different civilizations. Ultimately, the weakness of The Open Society and Its Enemies is that Popper's "open society" is open only to the ideas of Popper himself.

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