ike it or not, understand it or not, the philosophical insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein have provided the core of at least two major contemporary traditions of philosophy, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. As a philosopher whose works provide enough enigmatic substance to busy both the neopositivists—his earlier *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*—and the ordinary language theorists—his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations*—Wittgenstein clearly has earned a place of distinction among twentieth century philosophers. Both the "early" *Tractatus* Wittgenstein and the "late" *Investigations* Wittgenstein have generated distinct literatures, with additional literature emerging that attempts to grasp the connection between the two. Each literature has provided guidance...
for serious schools of political analysis, with *Tractatus* as a major part of the behavioralist's liturgy and *Investigations* as a major work in the post-behavioral movement.

The assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's utility for political analysis, then, focuses upon complex problems reaching to the basic contemporary divisions within political science. The early Wittgenstein (hereafter, Wittgenstein I) provides a statement about the limits of knowledge in relation to political evaluation by means of separating that about which we can speak from that about which we must remain silent (*Tractatus*, p. 151). The assumption that this meant value questions are unimportant parallels a quick interpretation of Max Weber's distinction of factual and evaluative analysis or a partial reading of David Hume which fails to link his analysis of is and *ought* statements with his assessment of induction. To be sure, the point of Wittgenstein I, and indeed of most post-Kantian thought, is compatible with the adherence to the fact-value dichotomy by the new "scientific" political theorists, but their positions could just as well be traced to any pragmatic, realistic perspective that argues for empirical demonstration of claims. The complexities of *Tractatus*, which led its author to frustration with the understanding of it expressed in Bertrand Russell's "Introduction," went far beyond the needs of most "behavioralists," with perhaps the exception of the most serious students of a cybernetic approach to systems analysis. Though often quoted for emphasis or impact, the main arguments of Wittgenstein I were seldom important in the behavioral movement's self-understanding. This is not surprising since the movement had and does have as its set goal to come up with laws and a theory of politics.


The *Investigations* have stimulated more serious attention to the actual arguments of Wittgenstein II, arguments generated by his later works. Wittgenstein II, sometimes presented as a self-rejection of the atomistic, positivist Wittgenstein I, attempts to move within the range of understanding language-in-use rather than setting forth the limits of language *per se*. That is, whereas Wittgenstein I demonstrated the *a priori* limits of formal language, Wittgenstein II searches for philosophic understanding of language and meaning. It is this concern to which the new upsurgence of interest in Wittgenstein can be attributed: the later works deal with the level of human meanings in a way that reintroduces human action and reasons for action to political analysis. This addition fills the void left by the overemphasis on psychological and sociological explanations of the behavioral movement that seemed to dehumanize our images of political man.  

In thinking through the significance of Wittgenstein's work for political analysis, it is possible to become torn between a scientific, dehumanized understanding of inter-subjective political theory and a vibrant, normatively suggestive understanding of a subjective political theory. But such a schizophrenic choice is not so obviously necessary if one stands back from Wittgensteins I and II, and attempts to place them in proper juxtaposition. The author of *Investigations* states in his Preface (p. x) that he wanted to publish *Tractatus with the new work because it "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." Though one senses his attraction and preference for his later works, the early are not denied as such; only the limited perspective on reality is challenged. It is a part of his thought that, hopefully, can be merged to form a Wittgenstein III. In this essay, the goal is to move toward adumbration of Wittgenstein III by means of assessing several recent volumes that attempt to link, directly or indirectly, Wittgenstein and political analysis. This is in the spirit of Wittgenstein's remarks: "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own" (*Investigation*, p. x).

The first volume under review attempts to explain Wittgenstein's philosophy by investigating the sources of the questions he tries to

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answer. The volume, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, treats both Wittgensteins, introducing an important moral (and political) interpretation of the very *Tractatus* that so often is viewed as the *bête noire* of moral and political speculation. For this reason, and because Wittgenstein's dilemmas remain to confront all twentieth century theorists, it is important to review this thesis of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin in terms of its importance to contemporary political analysis. In the process, the comprehensive approach they employ in explicating Wittgenstein's dilemmas (itself, we shall see, a beautiful exercise in *applying* Wittgenstein II) provides a useful demonstration of how one can fruitfully study other thinkers, including political philosophers. In addition, three works that extend and clarify the value of applying Wittgenstein II to political analysis are surveyed: Hanna Pitkin's *Wittgenstein and Justice* and Richard Flathman's *Political Obligation* and his edited *Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy*. Then, the potential of Wittgenstein's work for political analysis is evaluated.

**WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA AND PHILOSOPHY**

The Habsburg Vienna which collapsed with World War I serves both as symbol and context of Janik and Toulmin's explanation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein serves as the offspring Philosopher generated from the decay of an ineffective liberalism whose core was the Viennese bourgeoisie, just as the collapse yielded its Architect (Adolf Loos), its Composer (Arnold Schonberg), its Artist (Oscar Kokoshka), and its Poet (Hugo von Hoffmansthal). Though each is traced through his predecessors to his bourgeois origins, the central thrust of the tale is the influence of Karl Kraus and how the Krausian Circle moved the intellectual foundations from the artificial Habsburg Kakania toward a new understanding of truth, its limits, and the self-significance of recognizing the artificiality of everyday life in its many forms (chs. 2 and 3). The symbolic glimpse of Viennese Holden Caulfields and Yossarians is strongly undergirded with an exciting, comprehensive, believable picture of the underlying intellectual history. The familiarity of the theme that is generated by the contemporary paradox of modern society serves to focus attention not merely upon the search for "authenticity" or similar shibboleths, but rather upon what clues the analysis might provide for a better understanding of our own predicament. The contradiction of appearance and reality, which is the key interpretive
factor of the book, serves as the main topic of the "Postscript: The Language of Alienation" (ch. 9).

**The Context of Wittgenstein's Philosophy.** The route to the Postscript makes its title self-explanatory. It is the intellectual history of a decaying culture (one of the forms of life-Lebensformen-so important to Wittgenstein's later philosophy) that is in the process of collapse under its own weight, with significant help from an alliance of innovative intellectuals as well as the Grand Alliance. The first two chapters provide a close caricature of the Habsburg civilization and its reliance on taste, ornament, and symbol, and its non-adaptivity to the atomization of groups and growing sub-cultural identities. The division of appearance and reality led to the modern paradox of accepting social roles as one's world or of rebelling against them in preservation of real, personal characteristics. Social norms provided the cage within which individual alienation festered. Truth, and therefore communication, was limited by a decaying social structure. The pivotal figure in the transformation of the society was Karl Kraus, whose wit, satire, and intellectual powers were turned against the bourgeois and intellectualized arts in search of appropriate criteria for "artistic honesty and truth" as the "most important factors in life" (p. 69). The work of Kraus was in a sense destructive, a clearing away process, carefully described in terms of special language games (cll.: 3). Thus, the contradiction of appearance and reality is explored as a negating process rather than a route of positive articulation of new norms for the post-Kraus society:

The story of the Krausians is the story of moving the criteria of the arts from a critical stance against old Viennese culture toward the development of individually held "pure" forms for the arts that achieved internal, unadulterated criteria for truth and honesty rather than socially controlled standards (ch. 4). The role of ideals became suspect (p. 98) in the search for reality as found in the internal system of, say, the artist's personality, or a new musical system, or a moral authenticity. The cultural history of the Krausians is convincing and, as a whole, the Viennese drama presented seems not to extend far beyond the words of those who were part of it. 

This background sets the stage for the philosophical search of the internal logic of language, with the point of introducing Wittgenstein as the philosophical equivalent of Loos, Schonberg, Kokoshka, and

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Hoffmannsthal put off only for an essential background chapter that surveys the philosophical antecedents of his work drawn to the same point (ch. 5).

One of the special values of this readable book is its presentation of the developments of the philosophy of science, from Kant to the present, in terms of implications important on the Continent, but often lost in Oxbridge histories. Both in introducing the intellectual foundations of Wittgenstein I (ch. 5), and in discussing the consequences of *Tractatus* interpretations in England and by the Viennese Circle positivists (chs. 6, 7, and 8), the roots and consequences of Wittgensteins I and II are seen in highly intensified light. His work is seen as an outcome of the Kantian tradition which parallels Heinrich Hertz's notions of the mathematical structure of physics (pp. 139-146 and 180), thus linking traditional philosophy and science in a way anomalous to most political scientists' "positivist underpinnings," and the misuse—according to Janik and Toulmin—of the *Tractatus* by both Russell and the Viennese Circle because they did not take into their accounts the purpose of limiting the claims for scientific knowing to the sayable, but rather they limited the meaningful to only the sayable (chs. 7 and 8). The reason for the challenge, to these interpretations of the *Tractatus* rests in the thesis that Wittgenstein intended to show that things that matter are beyond the limits of scientific knowledge and language, not that things beyond scientific language do not matter. In a sense, the *Tractatus* freed Wittgenstein from the techniques of philosophy for "clear thought and right feeling, in areas where these really mattered—namely, in the sincere expression of human emotions, and in the free exercise of human fantasy, in Kraus's sense of the term" (p. 257). Wittgenstein can be seen as a product of Kantian liberalism, then, whose contemplation of the sayable—the rationally articulable—leads him to conclude in the *Tractatus* (and to some qualified extent in the *Investigations*) that proper limits for individual thought cannot be provided by scientific language.

To justify their challenge to the professional philosophers' views of the *Tractatus*, Janik and Toulmin add to the context of Vienna the movement between 1800 and 1920, stimulated by Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, that attempted to define the "scope and limits" of reason, first by dealing with 'representation', and second, with 'language' (p. 121). The chapter carries its readers through Arthur Schopenhauer and Fritz Mauthner in establishing Mauthner's legacy
to Wittgenstein: men are limited to a "metaphorical description of the world," which Wittgenstein later transformed to "representation' of the world having the form of a 'mathematical model,' in the sense in which Heinrich Hertz had analyzed the theoretical representations of the physical sciences" (p. 132). The attraction of Hertz's model of showing the limits of all possible experience from within (pp. 141-142), in contrast to Ernst Mach's descriptive approach to representation, and the theories of Ludwig Boltzmann in establishing statistical mechanics (pp. 143-144) are used to demonstrate the activity of picturing, of forming representations in the context of the limits of logical space. The division is seen as continuing between Wittgenstein's conceptions in the Tractatus and the erroneous interpretations of Mach's philosophical successors in the Vienna Circle. It is in correctly setting the internal limits of language that Wittgenstein places constraints on the "natural predisposition" of reason to extend its applicability beyond its limits (p. 147). Further extension of post-Kantian traditions that affected Wittgenstein include an Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Leo Tolstoy analysis, moving to a conclusion that reason not only is limited, but cannot speak to questions of the "meaning of life" (p. 165).

Chapter Five, "Language, Ethics, and Representation," is too packed to attempt to outline beyond these themes which lead one to a picture of a young Wittgenstein, confronted with the decay and debates of fin-de-siécle Vienna and with the ethics of Kierkegaard and Tolstoy and armed with the physical theories of Hertz and Boltzmann. This social and historical context is drawn tightly by Janik and Toulmin in interpreting Wittgenstein I as a moral theorist; Tractatus, as "An Ethical Deed" (ch. 6). The reconciliation of two histories of thought (in ethics and physics) is seen as the problem generated by Wittgenstein's milieu. The logical symbolism of Russell and Gottlob Frege provided the mathematics of language that permitted him to deal with internal limits, applicable to all discourse (pp. 181-185). Wittgenstein's approach to reality is, thus, a study of possible pictures or structuring of reality, not a simplistic operational view of the role of "pictures." Logic structures all form of the world, and though it cannot be itself modeled, it can be displayed (p. 188). It is in this fact that Tractatus is seen as a metaphor; it shows those who can grasp it a view of the nature and limits of language (p. 180). Thus there are two tasks achieved: (1) a masterly propositional calculus and (2) a negative statement that reason and
language do not permit discourse on "all that really matters" (p. 191). The "teaching" of Wittgenstein I, then, is that the limits of language and reason (and the only known forms of certainty) fall short of reaching matters of human importance. In Wittgenstein's words in personal correspondence: "The book's point is an ethical one" (p. 192).

The thesis of Janik and Toulmin is convincing: the ethical import of Wittgenstein seems more central to his work than various schools of neopositivism credit Wittgenstein I. It is a representation of a philosophical stance against certainty in matters of human existence and matters of value that suggests a negative vision of philosopher qua ethical, moral theorist. One can "see the world aright" only through "fable, polemics, irony, and satire" (p. 198). The role of philosophy is directed away from building "a body of doctrine" and toward guarding "continually against just that" (p. 199). By this personalization of morality into the world of action based on feeling, one can admit that herein moral theory becomes, with philosophy, nonsense (Unsinn), but one must beware of such a Krausian view (pp. 200-201) if another level of understanding is achievable. It permits integrating Wittgenstein's attraction to useful work and his willingness to proscribe philosophical analysis as a career for bright students (pp. 205-206), but it does not permit the pursuit of a higher understanding of human existence. It only permits one to feel, not to comprehend, the commonality behind the diversity.

In moving from this view of Wittgenstein I and its origins to Wittgenstein II, Janik and Toulmin accurately, but all too briefly, present the theorist of the language games. The move from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations is an effort to link language as used by man to describe reality and the way the rules of usage are established and employed. The query is, "How does linguistic significance develop?" The answer is, "By its use!" Thus, philosophical anthropology becomes the key in understanding how languages mean—which is the key to the philosophical task of "human self-understanding" (p. 223). Janik and Toulmin summarize:

For the later Wittgenstein, therefore, the "meaning" of any utterance is determined by the rule-conforming, symbol-using activities ("language games") within which the expressions in question are conventionally put to use; and these symbol-using activities in turn draw their significance from the broader patterns of activities (or "forms of life") in which they are a constituent element. The final solution of Wittgenstein's initial "transcendental" prob-
lem then consists in coming to recognize all the multifarious ways in which "forms of life" create legitimate contexts for "language games," and how these in turn delimit the scope and boundaries of the sayable. (p. 225)

In terms of how this view affects Wittgenstein I, it is important to note that the distinction between factual analyses (based on the limits of the *Tractatus*) and value analyses (based on language game meanings established by applying the *Investigations*) washes out unless the foundations for scientific knowledge are distinguished from beliefs. Janik and Toulmin recognize this problem (pp. 233-235), though they do not resolve it. Clearly Wittgenstein did see facts and values in separate spheres (in *Investigations* he continually distinguishes his philosophical puzzles from "science" and matters of fact), but we are left with what seems a paradox if the two works are seen as separate philosophies.

Wittgenstein II, which serves as the core of both Pitkin's and Flathman's work, attempts to grasp language meaning as it is used. But use, as Peter Winch points out, is based not on practices alone, but upon the "social context in which those practices are performed." The *Investigations* provides examples throughout of what Wittgenstein II saw as the proper role of philosophy: grasp the intended meaning of language-in-use and, through careful examination, understand its meaning and provide clarification of this meaning to remove unnecessary confusions generated within language games. Because of this role, the "very intelligibility of words like good and right is as dependent as that of all other linguistic expressions on the acceptance of those shared language games and forms of life within which they are given their standard uses" (p. 235). Thus Janik and Toulmin extend Wittgenstein II to divorce normative analysis from any higher meaning for values.

This nonetheless leads to a view of Wittgensteins I and II as compatible on the issue of a possible rational justification of higher values: there is none; on the issue of a possible positive statement of a personal philosophy: there is none; and on the issue of historical progression and purpose (pp. 243-245): there is none. Philosophy remains an active grasping for demonstrations of why puzzles in

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9 One can start to pursue this question at *Investigations*, I, 22-23, 109, 136, 225, and 544, and II, 224-226.

metaphysics (and elsewhere) are wrongly put, and is positive only by means of our personal enlightenment to our erroneous ways. The force of Wittgenstein's efforts, however, is lost if they lead to unnecessary professionalization, to technical specialization that places new limits of method on the speculative thought of the philosopher, because the point was "to guard against the imposition of needless constraints on clear thought and right feeling where these genuinely mattered (p. 257)." And this worry was applied to the techniques of both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* (pp. 257-261).

The philosopher is freed, by understanding language from within (Wittgenstein I) and/or by understanding purposive language usage (Wittgenstein II), from constraints on his emotions and morality generated by language, itself generated by either reason or conventions. Thus from the context of Wittgenstein's Vienna comes the formal articulation of the "modern project." 11 The languages (scientific and ordinary) of man and alienated him from higher visions had to be put in their limited places. Unless an esoteric lesson can be found in Wittgenstein's work, philosophy merely makes clear the human predicament. "All the individual could do was try, like Wittgenstein, to live in his own high-minded way, maintaining and exemplifying in his life his own exacting standards of humanity, intellectual honesty, craftsmanship, and personal integrity" (p. 269). Though Janik and Toulmin introduce "pathology" and "bogus language games" as a variant of Marxian "false consciousness"-a mechanism for projecting social and political upheaval (pp. 272-275)-the argument's force turns on an historicism which was rejected by Wittgenstein for good reason.

A Note on Interpreting the Creation of Philosophies. It is scarcely innovative to acknowledge the importance of a theorist's conceptual constraints on his theories. Whether applying the more formal language of *Weltanschauung* or Carl Lotus Becker's apt phrase, the "climate of opinion," interpreters of political theorists have long accepted the necessity of grasping the meanings of the theorist's concepts in understanding the meaning of his theory. 12


12 Becker's *The Heavenly City of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932) is the source of the presentation which demonstrates both the merit of the approach and its weaknesses by way of contrast
With Sheldon Wolin one must recognize this impact of context on a theorist's vision and its articulation, while at the same time admitting with Leo Strauss that the philosopher's vision consists of attempting to articulate a transcultural, transhistorical understanding. It is in this tension between the contextual, historical and the universal, philosophical understandings of political theorists and their works that one finds the significance of Wittgenstein's mechanisms for the comprehensive understanding of contemporary politics. Wittgenstein's theories, and indeed by example, Wittgenstein's Vienna, both clearly illustrate how the context out of which a philosophy is generated shapes the discourse of a philosophy and, therefore, its meaning and purposes.

The point is simple. The raison d'être of a theorist's work is found within the society and intellectual system that provide his language, his context. A reconstruction of a theorist's milieu, capturing the climate of opinion that was relevant to him, provides the critical first step in gaining an understanding of why he felt it worthwhile to construct his teaching for others. Just as understanding the Sophists and Socrates' Athens is essential in comprehending Platonic teachings, so too are the post-Kantians and Habsburg Vienna essential to Wittgenstein's teachings. And philosophic teachings of Wittgenstein are present, though necessarily learned indirectly by his conceptual, analytic method rather than by a summation of his position. All philosophers write for the ages, but at the same time their own age speaks to them about what it is that is worth struggling with in their era. In Athens, in Vienna, old roots of belief were in decay. The need for foundations for belief rooted in knowledge generated an option in understanding that makes sense only from a


theoretical vantage point beyond the context within which the problem emerged. A new language game emerges.

Wittgenstein's Vienna, then, provides an exciting example of a fruitful approach to the study of any political philosophy. Major innovations in the history of political theory can similarly be traced to contextual innovations, to points of transforming thought-and thought about thought-on a broad scale. These points of transformation often occur as social as well as intellectual crises, and give content to the relation of decay and the generation of individual thought. One thinks of a writer no less enigmatic than Wittgenstein, Niccolo Machiavelli.

Most certainly Machiavelli's context has not been ignored by his interpreters, yet treatments of his theory falter in explaining why he attempted a political theory unlike any of his predecessors. To be sure, "explanations" treat whether he was evil or not, anti-religious, anti-clerical or not, self-aggrandizingly political or not, and so on to other issues of motivation. But one fact common to many arts in Machiavelli's era tends to link him with a broader cultural interpretation of his works: he wrote at the moment when modern disciplinary orientations were being founded. Intellectual Gesellschaft based on a modern rationalist's construction of knowledge was replacing the intellectual Gemeinschaft of the Academy. Just as Leonardo's Notebooks separate out and pursue the techniques of art (dimensionality, perspective, proportions, etc.) at the expense of aesthetics, so too do Machiavelli's Prince, Discourses, and On War separate techniques of politics from ethics and philosophy. The focus is on the successful pursuit of goals based on rationally discovered contextual rules rather than on traditional, transcendental philosophic understanding. The role of man as creator, whether expressed in conceptualizing the unification of Italy or in the laudatory self-image developed in Benvenuto Cellini's Autobiography, points also to the merit of transferring the model of Wittgenstein's Vienna to such topics as "Machiavelli's Florence."

Conclusion. Janik and Toulmin have provided an interesting and valuable work both as a guide to understanding a deeper mean-

ing in Wittgenstein's works by recapturing the emerging language games of which he was a part and as a guide to fruitful interpretive methods applicable to other theorists. The book is also interesting, independent of its focus on Wittgenstein's philosophy, in its story of the growth of the twentieth century political consequences of modern scientific rationalism. The postscript is as well a postscript on the two major active Anglo-Saxon schools of philosophy, and thereby outlines the consequences of accepting the premises of either a neo-positivist social science or of a "relativist" perspective on the language of values. The authors recognize the poverty of positivism and of linguistic analysis in providing positive constructions of value evaluation, it seems, but fail to bolster our understanding -even our hopes for future understanding-of how to break through this poverty in regaining a positive human self-conception.

APPLICATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN TO NORMATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The later works of Wittgenstein have provided a framework for normative political analysis. Though one certainly cannot overlook the now classic volume of Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science*, which serves as the most familiar statement of the importance of the rules and the language of political action, the recent attention to Wittgenstein's philosophy by political scientists can be better traced to studies by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin and Richard E. Flathman. Both demonstrate, by example and argument, positive efforts at doing political philosophy rather than merely provide, as did Winch, critical overviews of why behavioral, empirical social science must fail because it cannot achieve an understanding of political action. To be sure, Winch's works articulate a serious part of the political understanding captured by Pitkin and Flathman, but both actually apply Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis to traditional "normative" problems of political theory.

*Pitkin's Wittgenstein.* Pitkin's movement toward *Wittgenstein and Justice* is, it is fair to say, the movement from exercising excellence in applying linguistic analysis, as demonstrated in her J. L. Austin-sparked *The Concept of Representation*, to discussing more formally the approach generated by Wittgenstein and extended by Austin and Stanley Cavell. Interestingly, a quote from Karl Kraus sets the stage for this earlier work, perhaps reinforcing the thrust of

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Wittgenstein's Vienna upon this approach to political analysis. With *Wittgenstein and Justice* we are provided a many-sided exploration into the potential of applying the approach to problems ranging from "justice" through "freedom" to many general aspects of relating linguistic analysis to political theory and action. The three hundred plus pages are difficult to summarize because Pitkin presents us a picture of her own explorations of Wittgenstein: "it is also a very personal book, because in a sense it is a record of my own intellectual development, the topics that concerned me" (p. viii). As Wittgenstein and Erich Heller discuss getting to know a city through multiple journeys (London and Rome, respectively—pp. x and vii), Pitkin successfully carries her readers through her journeys into Wittgenstein (and others), and through her efforts to demonstrate profit from the trips.

Pitkin introduces ordinary language analysis as a tool for clarifying political and political theory problems. Unwilling to downplay the limitations on comparative linguistic analysis of politics (as Dell Hymes unfortunately did) which stem from the fact that language affects politics as well as what one finds out about politics, Pitkin carefully explores the basic ingredients of ordinary language analysis that permit one to understand language-in-use. The purpose of the ordinary language approach, fostered in several closely related sibling groups (the Wittgensteinians, the students of Austin and Gilbert Ryle at Oxford, and the American scientific linguists, the best known of whom are Noam Chomsky and Paul Ziff), is to resolve those philosophical puzzlements that, though traditional disputes, are "resolvable through the study of ordinary language" (p. 6). Rather than equate the related activities to doing philosophy, Pitkin prefers to treat the approach as conceptual analysis. Her insights into the common points of the sibling schools are well developed in the explication chapters (chs. 1-7).

The first reservation one confronts in presenting ordinary language philosophy (or conceptual analysis) is the reason for accept-

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17 "Linguistic Aspects of Comparative Political Research," *The Methodology of Comparative Research*, eds. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 295-341. Hymes, of course, develops his arguments from a linguistic anthropology that assumes, as Pitkin and Wittgenstein do not, easily specified commonalities. His conclusion that language affects politics in almost unimportant ways, which pleased his editors whose focus is on the technology of comparative research, is in fact the opposite of the Wittgenstein traditions which affected another anthropologist, Clifford Geertz.
ing the technique of understanding language rules in order to resolve intellectual puzzles. In discovering meaning and implications, the appeal is not to the man on the street for knowledge, but rather to investigation of language rules. Pitkin points out that Wittgenstein argues "there is no common sense answer to philosophical problems" because, as Pitkin goes on, any philosophical "insight" must conflict with "what we ordinarily say" (p. 19). What is important is that since we use ordinary language in political theory and research, we must beware of problems and assumptions hidden in misuse of language.

Pitkin's presentation of Wittgenstein's basic notions is one of the easiest routes to the underlying principles available. Many portions of the ordinary language literature are integrated with Wittgenstein's major and minor works, often with long quotations designed to capture the examples that are so important to seeing the principles. Chapter Two too briefly condenses Wittgenstein I, but goes on to introduce (a) language as an activity captured by language games and (b) the mechanisms of learning the language games by seeing how the underlying rules work (seeing why in the game a "mistake" is a mistake). The good use of Wittgenstein's mathematics learning example (p. 49) illustrates well the value of Pitkin's journeys. The processes that give meaning to language games, the problem of recognizing family resemblances in language that permit application or recognition of such concepts as games, the activities associated with language, the role of grammar as the rules of language, and the roles of experience and context in establishing meaning are major topics (chs. 3 and 4) leading to the assessment:

The meaning of a concept grows out of its use in actual human life. In conceptual speculation we want to think about that meaning entirely apart from its use, but it is only in use that an expression fully makes sense (p. 98).

The problem of comparative analysis, given basic linguistic difference, is explored to articulate the need for discovering something behind language games that can cut through the cultural relativism that so affects language (ch. 5). This leads to the critical explications of "Grammar and Forms of Life" (ch. 6).

Grammar, for Wittgenstein II, expresses the essence of the world (p. 117). It provides the limits on "possibilities" just as logic did for Wittgenstein I (p. 121). The seemingly open character of language
and grammar, however, is conditioned (in terms of possibility) by "general facts of nature" that set parameters on conventional meanings. Such activities as defining colors or measuring lead to concepts that are conventional, but which would be different if "fundamental aspects of the world" were different (p. 124). Patterns of activities pursued by individuals are closely related to language; indeed, they contain its purposes. These "forms of life" are part of our "natural history," for Wittgenstein, and provide the natural regularities that make language games possible and meaningful (pp. 132-135).

Much as Rousseau's Emile discovers life and culture by his travels, so language games can be seen as the shared contextual interactions seen in a form of life. The forms of life are the given, the starting and ending point of analysis (p. 138).

Pitkin's Wittgenstein, then, is Wittgenstein II. Emphasis on action as purposive behavior (that is, as understood within the forms of life and political language game) rather than on behavior as factual event to be explained (that is, as understood from the perspective of an outside observer) provides the key theme of her analysis of political theory problems. Meanings as used in ordinary settings seem always preferred to external theoretical explanations. Precedence for Socrates over Thrasy machus on "justice" serves as her best example of employing linguistic analysis to specify how the Lebensform settles the meaning-in-use even though she grants Thrasy machus his due (ch. 8): he gives an accurate outsider's perspective on the use of the concept "justice." The problem here, and in other analyses passim, is in settling on the principle that the philosophical meaning is not, in contrast with Pitkin's view, this very outsider's perspective. For only such a perspective could yield a theoretical ground for explaining Lebensformen, admittedly a goal beyond Wittgenstein II. Except for this reservation; the applications to problems of "membership," and "the political" (ch. 9), the "is-ought" relationship and evaluation (ch. 10), and the many overlaps among action theory and social and political science and theory (chs. 11-13) each deserve attention because they raise questions that must be confronted.

The conclusion of Pitkin's journey is an imaginative comparison with existentialists and phenomenologists that brings together the same themes of the modern predicament found in Wittgenstein's Vienna. All three movements want to constrain reason; as stated about Wittgenstein, we are drawn "back to particular cases,
to the limitations of our humanity" (p. 318). If men are conceived as objects, "we are increasingly likely to treat them that way" (p. 321). But in Pitkin's articulation we are faced with a dilemma. Modern social science by its success challenges our subjective understandings (pp. 321-325), but these successes cannot be overlooked. It is as if causal explanations and subjective understandings compete as alternatives rather than existing as distinct language games that may be integrated. We are asked to accept "plurality of particular cases" and of "valid, rival claims" on an equal footing because of their subjective meanings which would be lost or distorted by any unifying theory (pp. 325-326). Ultimately one is faced with a cultural relativity for understanding words (p. 336) and an ethical silence concerning ethics (pp. 336-337) that somehow permit us to "move deeper into and through [alienation], and out the other side to whatever lies beyond" (p. 337). But while "accepted as given" forms of life and the limits of change may lead to "genuine change," it does not lead to knowing what criteria for change to pursue (pp. 338-340). Pitkin's Wittgenstein, it seems, takes us further along the route to applying ordinary language techniques to political theory puzzles and to conceptualizing political language games, but not toward answering normative questions.

As a postscript to Pitkin's Wittgenstein, it is important to note a discussion of the personal effects of philosophy on the theorist, effects that remind one of Plato's concern, expressed in the *Republic* (vii, 539-541b) and elsewhere, about preparation for philosophical insight:

Cavell has suggested parallels between Wittgenstein and Freud, that for Wittgenstein the primary goal of philosophy is self-knowledge; and that he writes indirectly or obscurely because, like Freudian therapy, he "wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change." Both Freud and Wittgenstein "are intent upon unmasking the defeat of our real need in the face of selfimpositions which we have not assessed ... or fantasies ('pictures') which we cannot escape" (p. xi).

But successful unmasking requires "inner change," and this view of the "modern predicament" gives no guide as to what that would be like.

*Flathman's Wittgenstein.* Two of Flathman's recent works provide especially accessible explications of Wittgenstein II. Both in *Political Obligation* and in *Concepts in Social and Political Philos-*
ophy, problems long central in the studies of and history of political theory serve as the central focus of analysis; an analysis and restatement of the problem of obligation, ranging from the Greeks to John Rawls, serves as the subject of the former; concepts such as "authority," "freedom," "equality," and "the public interest," in the latter. Because the approach itself is central to this review, Flathman's special arguments for conceptual analysis as a valid and valuable approach to teaching and doing political philosophy serve as the subject of this section. In his Preface to the Concepts anthology, Flathman makes clear that the approach he espouses is not antagonistic to the more traditional assessments of a philosopher's doctrines, but shares the purposes of gaining "an understanding" and prompting "critical reflection concerning prominent and persistent features of the political dimensions of the life of man" (p. v).

This approach to conceptual analysis is not merely focused on a single concept since what clarifies the meaning of one key concept will be closely related to other key concepts (p. v). It is focused on meanings-in-use in order to clear away mistaken debates and false issues by means of applying the principles and methods of linguistic philosophy, which are themselves founded on answers to general questions about language derived from the philosophy of language (Concepts, p. 2). The key work providing the substance of Flathman's approach is, of course, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. In contrast with Pitkin's journeys through Wittgenstein II, Flathman's concise, exact "Introduction" to Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy provides the best condensation of Wittgenstein II available (pp. 1-40). If the difficulty of getting the arguments and definitions in too easy a form is set aside for the moment, the merit of these pages for instruction cannot be overestimated. They provide a backdrop for excellent selections of many key conceptual analyses already available for those who find the approach valuable in the classroom."

Flathman's presentation of Wittgenstein emphasizes that meaning

is in language, which is "diverse and has no essence," is used to communicate, and is known by knowing what speakers of the language do with it (p. 5). Knowledge of how to use concepts is a form of knowledge about the nonlinguistic phenomena of which one speaks. Analysis must be descriptive; it is to "assemble reminders" that permit us to avoid pseudo-problems as a "philosophical therapy [that] requires distinctions between sense and nonsense, between correct and incorrect uses of languages" (pp. 5 and 6). Analysis, then, focuses on rules because "knowledge of the rules is a necessary and sufficient condition of using the concepts with meaning and of knowing their meaning when others use them" (p. 14). This focus emphasizes the importance of shared rules or conventions and is closely related to Wittgenstein's insistence against the possibility of private languages. Knowing the rules must be accompanied by knowing how to apply them, which necessitates linking the rules with knowing the techniques of a language game.

Behind language games are purposes (activities), or Lebensformen, which are undergirded by the "bedrock" of "general facts of nature" (pp. 22-25). The bedrock is well captured by Flathman: "general facts of nature are features and properties of ourselves and the world that are not the result of choices, decisions, and actions on the part of human beings" (p. 27). The "facts" provide the necessary condition for language games. Essential notions of these facts, however, are not the province of philosophy (pp. 28-30). Instead of seeking theoretical understanding of politics, Flathman's Wittgenstein seeks conceptual therapy so that "philosophers can know about, can understand, the human activities of which concepts are an integral part" (p. 33). Though Flathman carefully explains why he is pursuing the application of the approach in spite of Wittgenstein's rejoinders concerning the complexities of dealing with politics (pp. 33-38), we are left with an analytic approach that places all criteria of meaning concerning political questions with the agreed upon rules of proper meanings by actors in a language game.

Although this summary of Flathman's Wittgenstein captures the analytic scope of the approach (an approach that provides an excellent framework for careful, systematic analysis of political philosophy problems in a textual as well as contextual motif), it is important to emphasize the special treatment of "human action," as distinct from "behavior," that is the key to the significance of rules
for political studies (Political Obligation, p. 3). Rules, which provide patterns and guidance, are important "only if those who are guided by alleged rules, or who use alleged rules, think that there are good reasons for accepting and conforming to them" (p. 67). In political obligation, the "normative" question is basically over whether good reasons exist for accepting the rule (p. 68). Rules, in political action, require regularity, choice, and a criterion for evaluation. Action is with choice for reasons, not merely a result of conditioning as in behavior. Throughout the analysis, these characteristics of action lead one to assess political discourse and reasons on the human, mental level rather than the causal, behavioral level, and make clear that political discourse is humanly meaningful only at this level. Again, the internal constraints of language games are those of Wittgenstein II. Criteria for political discourse are absent if there is not a shared political language game, which brings one again to the modern predicament.

IMPLICATIONS OF WITTGENSTEIN FOR NORMATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The implications of Wittgenstein for normative political analysis can best be seen by standing back from his arguments. Some theoretical distance is needed if the language games of Wittgenstein II are to provide more than a guide for describing normative relativity or if Wittgenstein I is to serve as more than a warning against attempting discourse on things that matter. To be sure, each dimension of Wittgenstein's work facilitates important aspects of political analysis. But neither provides a mechanism for doing more than attempting to describe political actions and language as they exist. What is more, if we accept Janik and Toulmin, we cannot even directly tie our theories to an underlying (corresponding) reality, but are forced to deal with names employed to move from the logical structures of science to facts about the world.

By standing back from the two Wittgensteins, the issues confronting the development of social and political theory are partially clarified by each system of thought. Scientifically founded theory, following Wittgenstein I, takes the form of a special language game, based on a special Lebensform, that seeks to root itself in the most general facts of nature in a special, factual way. To be sure, science employs a multiplicity of theories-intentionally the notion "paradigm," dealt with clearly by Wittgenstein, is here avoided because of more common social science usages that distort his point-and,
therefore, multiple specific language games. But each game bases its criteria for "correctness" upon the common *Lebensform* of doing science. Although the special game of science does have commonalities with ordinary language games, it is clear that the epistemological rules governing scientific activity perform a different purpose from those of other games; that is, the criteria for testing beliefs are distinct from the shared purposive goals found enmeshed with procedural rules in ordinary language games. This does not necessarily say that science is a better game; only that it is of a different order. It leads to an outside observer's perspective and the possibility of achieving theoretical explanation as well as description.

The level of understanding achieved by Wittgenstein II leads to understanding through getting inside ordinary human language. This is a proper starting place for political analysis because politics, reasons for actions, and purposes in general are the key ingredients for understanding normative problems. The frustration with Wittgenstein II, however, comes from the self-imposed sanctions of the approach against making any general statements about the understanding so achieved. One can grasp, describe, understand politics within the limits of the game, but cannot theorize about this understanding. Only by standing back from a multiplicity of political language games and finding family resemblances among them can the process of theorizing about politics be reconstituted. Finding comparable concepts within political language games would permit developing a political theory based on the subjective, human dimensions of political action so identified (Wittgenstein II) that also meets, or is confronted with, the criteria for developing intersubjective, scientific analysis (Wittgenstein I). Such a theory would overcome the schizoid dilemma with which we began by developing a scientific theory of subjective political language games, a Wittgenstein III.

The goal is certainly not a new one for students of linguistic analysis. Winch himself permits at least the possibility of finding common dimensions and assumptions behind any language games, but the extension of Clifford Geertz's approach to cultural anthropology provides more immediate rewards for constructing a Witt-

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In the lead essays of his *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, he develops Ryle's notions of thick description (culturally rich action theory) in preference to thin description (impoverished cross-cultural generalizations). Though in Geertz's methodological arguments, which specifically assume Wittgenstein II, the hope for universal theories beyond thick descriptions of cultures is downplayed, he continually makes comparisons among cultures in his specific studies. By developing a better grasp of thick descriptions one can develop a more meaningful foundation for theory that crosses over into the realm and methods of science. Perhaps then the important links between, and parallel explanations of, the action (purpose) and behavior (cause) levels of human existence can be explored.

Even a comprehensive political theory that links Wittgensteins I and II, and the corresponding important levels of political understanding, would not directly speak to issues of normative choice. It would describe and clarify political discourse among and between citizens and theorists and theoretically explain common aspects of political language games both at the action and behavior levels. The normative significance of these theories, however, depends on some criteria for evaluating the games in terms of whether they are as they ought to be. By standing back further still from Wittgenstein we can ask what we have learned. Political beliefs and norms, indeed "justice," derive their meanings from how they are used. The beliefs are reflections of underlying general facts of nature bent by human purposes. In short, experience leads to good reasons for "justice" in each language game as well as establishing the meaning of the term. Our own notions too are thus uncertain reflections, but meaningful in political communication so long as they are shared. Visualizing a series of such games, a family of resemblances can be sought for usages among collectivities wherein there is an active political existence that is not present in settings of political decay, such as Habsburg Vienna.

Does this tell us something far deeper about the meaning of such terms and the tragic effects of discovering the artificial nature of conventional beliefs without reaching the internal transformation necessary to be satisfied with a philosophical grasp of the nature of man and of political values? Language games may elude us in specifying their essence, but *they are themselves nonetheless essential to*
social, political existence. Their very necessity provides a profound insight into the nature of man and of society that can be founded on the natural philosophy entailed in a Wittgenstein III. It would speak from nature about the criteria for evaluating language games from the perspective of natural necessity. Sufficiency would always remain to be explored theoretically.

All four books are highly valuable contributions to the goal of applying Wittgenstein to political analysis. Each book, because of its substance, cuts into both the difficult pathways of Wittgenstein's arguments and clarifies some significant aspect of politics. Though it is difficult to imagine that either Wittgenstein, I or II, will become the sole guide to political philosophy analysis, it is difficult to imagine a political analysis which any longer ignores Wittgenstein with four such valuable guides to his work available.

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