

On the Teaching of Ancient and Medieval Political Theory

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If man should decide on certain things as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not, after having decided on them, consent to listen to anything not in harmony with the really good.

—The Emperor Marcus Aurelius,
Meditations, V, 12

But when they had tied him up with a thong, Paul said to the centurion who was standing by, "Is it lawful for you to scourge a Roman citizen, and uncondemned?"

—*Acts of the Apostles*, 22:25

The San Francisco Examiner recently reported a Bay Area survey which unexpectedly discovered that political science had suddenly become popular again on local campuses. Needless to say, most government departments had long been in the doldrums after the unspeakable boredom of behavioral orthodoxy and the spate of what is politely called "activism" during the 1967-72 period, which saw the Vietnam war and other assorted causes elevate sociology, psychology, theology, and, for God knows what reason, English departments to the ephemeral rank of "with it" enclaves. Abruptly, however, the unhappy but certainly headline commanding activities of Mr. Nixon and his loyal band of friends came to the rescue of political science departments as the all-absorbing topic in that jungle of competing departments known as the modern university.

During the House Judiciary Committee

Impeachment Proceedings, which will undoubtedly themselves become classic political science texts, I recall listening on National Public Radio to an interview with a Washington, D. C., lawyer on the effect of Watergate on the legal profession especially when so many good young lawyers were implicated to the detriment of that profession. He said the effect was devastating and that law schools are now rushing to *inaugurate* courses in legal ethics. As this was probably the first time people began to realize that lawyers did *not* study ethics, the admission was even more serious. This same admission could also undoubtedly emanate from most of the nation's political science departments. The downfall of Mr. Nixon will undoubtedly portend a new interest in and demand for a knowledge of the history and importance of ethics and morality in politics.

Max Lerner recently cited the study of

Daniel Yankelovich, "Changing Values on the Campus," in arguing that the concern for morality has not risen from the professional political science or legal departments but from students outside these traditional sources. Values and their justifications have suddenly become the central issue of our political lives.

Values are the questions we put to life, and it is exciting to have it confirmed that the young are starting to put the right questions in the right way. But values are not just dreams and wishes. They are also experiential—the way we do or don't live the questions we put to life. Whether the young will live out their bargain with society and avoid the destructive split and make a whole of their lives instead of fragmenting them—that still remains to be tested, beyond the wish. . . .

Thus there is little doubt that in many areas the college young are the values path-breakers. But the signs are still strong, although receding, that America not only has two value systems but remains two nations. (Lerner, "Two Sets of Values," *San Jose News*, California, August 10, 1974)

The further import and significance of this, I feel, can be seen in President Ford's first address to the Congress at a time when public morality is precisely the burning issue: "We have thousands of far better preachers and millions of sacred scriptures to guide us on the path of personal right-living and exemplary official conduct, but we must begin at home, not in Washington." But the question must now be directly faced—have we allowed our youth and ourselves to study and reflect and pray about the sources and validity of ethical conduct? Have we been allowed to teach morality and justice as true? I think the answer to this is rather in the negative. What has saved us was rather our political constitu-

tion which itself was based on an ethics and a right we suddenly discovered we needed at a moment of national political peril. Of this earlier tradition, Jeremy Campbell recently wrote this to the British:

The original framers of the Constitution who met at Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were by no stretch of the imagination dreamers and Utopian idealists. They were men of the world, merchants, lawyers and speculators who had seen human nature in its least angelic moments and did not by any means subscribe to the idea of the perfectibility of man.

They had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation, and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious," the historian Richard Hofstadter wrote. "To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. They did not believe in man, but they did believe in the power of a good political constitution to control him." ("Our Return to the First American Dream," *London Express*, reprinted in *San Francisco Examiner*, August 11, 1974)

But while granting what must be granted to this modern political philosophy interpretation of the founding fathers, still the question of the meaning and legitimacy of public morality, as the new President seems to sense, lies much deeper so that the rush to political science and morality needs much further reflection.

In any case, this popularity of legal ethics and political science is curious. The nation had just announced—usually under the auspices of various linguists, baby doctors, sociologists, theological poets, and Shakespearean scholars—that it did not want to fight any more foreign wars. (We had made practically the same announcement in the 1920's and 1930's.) We even made friends with old enemies as the world's foremost political science professor

visited Peking and Moscow and who knows where else. For a while we applauded our student leaders for piously burning their draft cards—that is, for disobeying the law—and exiling themselves virtuously to Canada—few, evidently, chose Bulgaria, or India, or Kuwait. During the height of Watergate Senate Hearings, I saw a bumper sticker in Golden Gate Park which read, “No Amnesty for Nixon.” *Quid pro quo*.

The somber *New York Times* had found that some of the news fit to print was purloined from stolen documents. For this heroic act down came the Pulitzer Prize. Next, so swiftly do our principles seem to come home to roost, came a new Mideast war, with hints that we might need to send troops, certainly an alert, then oil crises. Some wars are better not to fight than others. And then the President himself came to symbolize injustice, for losing tapes, for firing people, for disobeying the law, for bugging things, for obstruction of justice contrary to his sworn oath. He even finally seemed to admit it though not to the satisfaction of us all. We are, of a sudden, astounded to discover that the “in” thing is to *obey* the law. Honesty *is* the best polity as well as policy. Hence, we should study politics, or at least politicians.

This brings up something of an embarrassing problem, of course. For political science, not to mention law, is not at all in that good a theoretical shape to be blithely talking to rooms full of recently “concerned” students about something called “justice” or “morality”—even though such particular subjects happened to be the very ones Plato began the whole subject of political thought in the first place. Alas, for too many students of government, the noble Plato has been someone who crops up in a footnote in the chapter on Fascism during the 1930’s. The sharp student will, in any case, spot the difficulty disturbingly soon. For if modern political thought is approv-

ingly founded on Machiavelli, as all the textbooks agree—on what politics *does* do, not on what politics *ought* to do, on Max Weber’s value free science—then why has it been all right to be angry with Mr. Nixon whose only *theoretical* flaw, by the criterion of so-called modern political theory, seems to have consisted in being caught and losing power? Should Mr. Nixon perchance have succeeded in weathering the storm, he would not have been by the standards of post-Machiavelian thought “immoral” at all, but a veritable political genius. But since he did not finally succeed, this merely means the existence of shrewder politicians than the former president, that, in the end “those who were out to get” Mr. Nixon, got him.

Nevertheless, the students are ostensibly in our classrooms not to find the logical consistency of social science research but because they have been morally angry that justice has been objectively violated. There is no other way to put it. In truth, there is really not much fun or point in being angered at a game plan or a linguistic fallacy. Moreover, the students are not even much interested in the ancient traditions of legal procedure as it affects *de facto* political leaders, though there may now be a revival here. No one has explained to them from the moral and religious side why the traditional rules and procedures for achieving justice are so complex and so necessary. They are even surprised to discover that Aristotle’s definition of law—reason without passion—applies to themselves, especially in judging others, even in impeaching a president.

Consequently, on reflection, taking the worst possible interpretation of all the evidence, that is, assuming Mr. Nixon was guilty as sin as seems more or less to be the case on many counts, why was he not nevertheless doing exactly what political science textbooks have been prescribing and assum-

ing ever since we began to insist that values and ethical standards as such were "irrational," mere "choices," "prejudices," "assumptions," which merely opt for goals, but which can in no way "scientifically" be justified, is not at all clear. Moral anger, of which we have such an oversupply, perhaps with cause, is definitely out of place in the theoretical world of our modern social sciences, except perhaps as an object of research on its frequency in the general society.

Unless, then, there is an absolute oughtness in some sense to what the president (and everyone else) should do, a moral accountability based on some certain and universal criterion—the written law itself, including the Constitution, must also have its moral justification—what grounds did we have to be angry when the ex-president apparently tried to follow exactly the program laid down by the texts in political theory on the subject of the invalidity of absolute norms? To muddle things, if possible, even further, Mr. Nixon himself would probably have held for an absolute norm!

To be sure, there is recently a movement variously called post-behaviorism which demands a radical choice of values for restructuring all men and society according to something usually described as "human needs." The radical merely suggests to the behaviorist or the modern that since you have no real objection to my values in theory, why not support them? A surprisingly large number of old-boy behaviorists have in fact actually gone this route. Yet, the radical solution is no real answer since the very question it brings up is the content of the definition of "human needs." From the viewpoint of classical political thought, many of these needs often begin to look strikingly anti-human. In all of this, the student is given precious little insight into the notion of political anger, its moral limits and political justification,

the way it leads directly to a supposition of permanent values.

The confusion is far-reaching. In an odd, presumably relevant article entitled, "The Biological Foundations of Political Science: Reflections on the Post-Behavioral Era," Professor Thomas Langdon Thorson gives us a taste of some of the meat our students are invited to chew over. "Man is the product of an evolutionary process stretching back some six billion years," we begin thus with a dogma we all believe. (*The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives in Political Science*, McKay, 1972, p. 270) Thus, "the twentieth century man can see the vastness of time and its overriding significance," something "Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas" could not have known, while Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke could have known it only vaguely. (p. 271) We are next informed that "zoologist Robert Bigelow suggests that the only possible way to explain the biologically extraordinary fact of the trebling of size (the measure of increased complexity would, of course, be many times three) of the human brain in a relatively short period of time (by evolutionary standards) is the continued presence of an unusually powerful selective force." (p. 261) This force turns out to be a subtle version of increased cranial activity due to the necessity of survival—something, presumably, that happened about six billion years ago. Next we are informed that man's intelligence is based on this larger brain size, but also that the "men of Philadelphia," whose mere two hundred year old political invention still survives, showed that larger brain size also meant more intelligence. (p. 262) Finally, we arrive at the astonishing observation that "we must recognize that Plato and Aristotle, for all their towering achievement, were from an evolutionary point of view a step or two from the primitive." (p. 279)

In one sense, I suppose, it does little good

to comment on such nonsense. If man really is the product of an evolutionary process starting back about six billion years ago, then we are going to have to have some pretty mathematically dull students to believe that Plato and Aristotle, who lived about 2500 years ago, not to mention Aquinas who lived seven hundred years ago, and even Descartes who lived about three hundred years ago, were just a step from the primitive in a six billion year process. Furthermore, we are going to have to have students who are completely ignorant of the invention of the balance scales to believe either that recent phenomenal progress in knowledge since Rousseau and Madison, caused by this same powerful selective force that once trebled the size of the brain, did not logically result in a considerably larger physical brain size (evolution goes fast, we are told, at times) or else that the towering achievements of Plato and Aristotle were not in fact some sort of a biological miracle. The only alternative to this jumble of academic confusion is to insist that the student actually read Plato and Aristotle, Tacitus and Thucydides, Aquinas and Augustine to discover that they are speaking quite intelligibly about very lively issues—like the grounds of justice and the limits of law—no matter how close to the primitive they may have been. In other words, the effort to rid ourselves of the discussion of justice by relegating it back on some sort of evolutionary time scale will never do.

The great intellectual crime in our culture today is the almost systematic cutting away of our students—who are themselves by no means totally innocent on this score—from our universal human tradition by opting for some sort of biological or progressive theory which ignores the basic fact that Plato and Aristotle were quite as much men as ourselves. The *Antigone* of Sophocles (another near primitive, presum-

ably) or the trials of Socrates and Jesus are much better grounds for discussions about and understandings of justice than anything our students will chance to find in the theoretical literature or in the newspapers or TV analyses of Mr. Nixon's crimes. Indeed, the reading of the ancient Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Medievals makes one wonder if there has not really been rather a "devolution" in many respects since their time.

We are hard pressed, then, to see where someone like, say, Michael Harrington says much other than what we can find in the Prophet Amos or the Twenty-fifth Chapter of Matthew. What this really means, of course, is that political theory is not very "evolutionary" at all. The ancients recognized quite clearly that corruption and decline were as much a part of its subject matter as growth and virtue. The very greatest thing the student today can be told is that we *can* be worse than our ancestors. We do not *have* to be better, nor are we necessarily so. If any generation of mankind does not at least know this, it is simply being deceived—or more properly, it is deceiving itself. And even students with voting and drinking rights are free to indulge in this latter sort of laissez-faire enterprise.

In another survey of political science teaching, Malcolm Scully found that Watergate had touched every course in American government but that every variety of analysis and reaction to its meaning could be found being proposed on the university campuses. ("For Political Scientists, Watergate Poses Unique Teaching Problems" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 19, 1973) Yet, there appears to be surprisingly little evidence in this survey that the real issue this crisis brought up was not about the mechanics of our political system but about the nature and meaning of justice itself. And this question simply cannot be discussed by refusing to demand that we

all, students and teachers alike, return to the classical origins of justice thought. The reason why we are suddenly being forced to return to our past, and not just our American past, to consider even everyday problems and scandals that are the topic of current events is because we have cut our students and ourselves from the ethical and political heritage upon which our public system was founded, a tradition whose essence is the recall of justice and its limits.

Hannah Arendt has remarked:

Without testament or, to resolve the metaphor, without tradition—which selects and names, which hands down and preserves, which indicates where treasures are and what their worth is—there seems to be no willed continuity in time and hence, humanly speaking, neither past or future, only sempiternal change of the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in it. Thus the treasure was lost not because of historical circumstances and the adversity of reality but because no tradition had foreseen its appearance or its reality, because no testament had willed it for the future. (*Between Past and Future*, Viking, 1968, pp. 5-6)

For in attempting to achieve a “scientific” politics, we have made Aristotle and Plato into primitives with the result that we are incapable of establishing any reason why we are involved in a continuing drama which has its origins in the ethical condition mankind has borne at least since we know anything about him. Our biological heritage is not enough, or even of much interest in this regard, for clearly it is what is willed that disturbs and angers us. Our students need to know what there is to be “handed down.” Otherwise, in a crisis, they find themselves thinking about political ethics with no recognition that their moral criterion is something common to all mankind, including those who have preceded

us, who somehow often thought more clearly than we ourselves in these matters. Surely one of the great ironies of all of this will be the degree to which our tradition of the separation of church and state, our refusal to face the need of moral knowledge at the university level for all students, has contributed to the present drama.

Most universities, I take it, still have scheduled a course variously entitled the “History of Political Thought,” “Great Political Thinkers,” or some such lofty title. Usually, the history of political theory is not conceived primarily as a history course—the history of Roman Law or the Institutions of the Greek City-State—for historians are jealous of anything that bears their name without departmental control. Subjects called variously anthropology or sociology, or behavioral studies also purport some interest in such matters as do classics departments where they still exist. What I am interested in here is to argue for the absolute necessity for the undergraduate student—and not only the student of political science or law—to discover again for himself the ethical heritage of ancient and medieval political theory, a heritage that will necessarily also touch upon the validity and necessity of metaphysics. I recognize this is necessarily a more or less sort of thing and that the very notion of academic “requirement” is often looked upon askance. Yet, I am convinced from my own experience at least that a program of introduction to the core of this tradition will often appear as a sort of unexpected revelation to our students, who immediately recognize that it meets precisely that lack of moral and even ontological and theological context which they find missing in contemporary political and legal theory but which is now insisted upon in public life. Consequently, at the present moment in our history, I think it worthwhile for someone to attempt to spell out just about what a

good student should have read, whether he be fortunate enough to have a professor in the political science department to insist upon it or not, whether he have a university core curriculum brave enough to insist that he should know his past or not.

To be sure, I do not wish to exclude the study of so-called modern or American or twentieth century political theory from eventual study, though I am quite certain such later studies, commenced in medias res, are barren and largely unintelligible without a beginning in ancient and medieval theory. Further, I do not wish to suggest that the kind of political theory that arose and flourished after Machiavelli right up to the present day is simply not pertinent in understanding where we are. But it is inadequate to handle the deep kinds of spiritual and moral problems that are arising in the fields of every day politics. In a sense, the fact is today that living politics have discovered theory and morality, not vice versa. This is what the student, even the so-called radical, is looking for so that he is rightly turned off by much of what he finds in the average presentation of legal and political theory. Indeed, I would suggest that the intellectual cause of much contemporary radicalism and revolutionary thought in the peculiar form it has in fact taken (in another sense all political thought is radical) is largely explained by a failure ever to be confronted with classical theory in any meaningful fashion.

Furthermore, the failure of the universities to demand a basic minimum of general education which would refuse to grant the noble name "education" to any student unexposed to and ignorant of the classic thought of our kind has paradoxically resulted in a "politicization" of most university courses themselves such that "politics" escapes the intellectual discipline of its origins and limits to become the play thing of every other department in academe.

There is a further problem today. All university students have been legally declared political adults. The value of the vote of the teacher and the student is exactly the same. But voting rights do not as such make any one aware of political tradition and political ethic. We must *will* our tradition. And this means effort and study and reflection without which our reactions to contemporary "injustices" and abuses of power are frighteningly inadequate, if not dangerous.

What I wish to suggest here, then,—and I think it needs to be concretized at this point of time—is a minimal scheme of matter in classical and medieval political theory that would serve as an introduction and a foundation to the moral level of political theory that is required today. We should have no doubt that this is what is being searched for and argued about. Perhaps there are two caveats necessary in this regard. The first is that political theory cannot by itself supply what is lacking elsewhere in the university curriculum—though of its nature it can do better than practically any other field, not without reason did Aristotle call it the highest of the practical sciences. The student who comes to the political thought course ignorant of theology, philosophy, and history is crippled. We are desperately in need of a generation of students passionately angered at the fact that they have been deprived of their tradition.

A couple of years ago, I asked a beginning class of some forty how many had ever heard of Homer. Three held up their hands. Last year, I asked a student, "who wrote the *Epistle to the Romans*?" He said he never heard of it. I inquired of another what the story of the Good Samaritan was about. "The Good Who?" I should like to think such lacunae are mere humorous sidelights. But it is not so. Such students, I think, should be furious at an education-

al and cultural background that could leave them in such ignorance at twenty years of age. There are encouraging signs that this is beginning to be the case.

A second warning is taken from C. S. Lewis' advice about any truly great book:

An unliterary man may be defined as one who reads books once only. There is hope for a man who has never read Malory or Boswell or *Tristram Shandy* or Shakespeare's *Sonnets*: but what can you do with a man who says he "has read" them, meaning he has read them once, and thinks that this settles the matter? ("On Stories," *Of Other Worlds*, Bles, 1966, p. 17)

In other words, classical and medieval political theory is based upon a series of books and reflections and codes that are among the greatest mankind has produced. The professor, the university can do little more than give the student an initial chance at their riches. The failure of education is when the chance is not given. The failure of the student is when he considers it necessary to read only once.

Where to begin? In a sense, I am in much sympathy with the reflection of Salvador de Madariaga on the spiritual heritage of Europe which, in this area, is ours also:

But if the body of Europe may be referred to a frame of reference composed of three rivers (the Rhone, the Rhine, and the Danube), the soul is the outcome of a meeting of these two mighty streams of tradition: Socrates and Christ; for Socrates taught Europe to respect freedom of thought and Christ taught her to respect the human person. . . . ("Europe of the Four Karls," 1973 Charlemagne Award Lecture, *The Tablet*, London, 23 July 1973, p. 580)

What is significant to the discussion here, however, is de Madariaga's practical propo-

sal which urgently needs some form of American implementation:

We want to set up a European State but we are dying of too much state about us. We must instill into our youth the feeling of individual responsibility for individual destiny. We might devise means for encouraging such an attitude. We should for instance formally receive as European citizens every new generation; at an adequate time, and during the ceremony present to each youth a copy of a book bearing the texts from Plato describing the death of Socrates, and from the Gospels describing the death of Christ, not merely because they are the two spiritual fathers of Europe but because they both perished at the hands of the state.

Perhaps such a rite is too formal for us, though a bit of formality is undoubtedly part of what we lack. Nevertheless, it recognizes clearly what is lacking in our political atmosphere. I believe we must have the corporate courage at least to insist upon an academic requirement which can give the student the liberty of his tradition. For this is what is at issue, students who are not free because they have never heard of the Good Samaritan or of the *Histories* of Tacitus, or the death of Socrates.

What would be a minimum core of reading that a student should do to be free enough to begin the great enterprise of classical and medieval theory out of which our ethical standards and instincts in politics have arisen? I believe a semester is much too short a time, yet it is probably all that will ever be available in a formal sense. Further, I believe that the professor's commentaries and the readings of secondary analyses should be held at a minimum. What is of prime importance is exposing intelligently the student to an actual reading of the essential tradition. It will soon become clear that the actual tradition will

bear itself. Any student who does not cover at least these materials during his university years must be considered, must consider himself, in some sense, an intellectual cripple. I do not insist necessarily on the "great books" only but rather a combination which would include reading, discussion, writing within a context of the flow of ancient and medieval thought. I would say that it is essential to cover all the material, for it is a sort of overall sense of political thought and its abidingness that must be grasped.

The core of what I suggest is a persistent, attentive reading of the following works:

1. The *Peloponnesian War* of Thucydides.

2. The *Republic* of Plato, The *Apology* and The *Crito*.

3. The *Politics* of Aristotle.

4. Selections on law and constitution of Cicero. *De Officiis III*.

5. The *Annals* and *Histories* of Tacitus.

6. From the *Old Testament*: Psalm 8; Deuteronomy 5-7; at least one of the Books of Kings or Chronicles; Isaiah 64-66; Amos.

7. From the *New Testament*: Matthew 5, 16, 22:15-22; Luke 2; 14:1-14; 10:25-37; John 18-19; Acts 2; 4:5-22; 5:1-11; 5:27-32; 10:34-43; 16:35-40; 17:16-34; 18:23-41; 22:22-28; 24:22-25; Romans 13; 1 Corinthians 13; Galatians 1-5; Philémon; James 1:22-2:26; 1 Peter 2:13-25; 1 John 1-5.

8. Augustine. The *Confessions* should be read but do not belong properly to political theory. The *City of God* is too vast and selections are less than satisfactory, I recommend instead Herbert Deane's *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*, Columbia University Press.

9. The Treatise on Law from the *Summa* of Aquinas—Questions 90-108 of I-II.

10. Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe*, Meridian.

Along with this and in chronological sequence, I recommend a reading of short treatments, either books or essays, of the political climate of Ancient Israel (perhaps Orlinsky, *Ancient Israel*, Cornell); Greece (perhaps Barker or Kitto); Rome (perhaps F. E. Adcock, *Roman Political Ideas and Practice*, Ann Arbor); feudalism (perhaps Ganshoff or Stevenson or Pirenne); and medieval theory (perhaps Morrall, *Political Thought in Medieval Times*, Torchbooks). It would be well to accompany all of this with a standard textbook such as Sabine, McDonald, Catlin, or for a more theoretical level, Charles N. R. McCoy.*

This is a decent amount of matter but it is certainly a minimum for the importance of the issues involved. I do not believe such a course should be presented under the rubric of relevancy, for in a sense what is at issue is the student's encounter with an ethical-political approach that is itself educative. The very study carries one into the questions of justice and injustice, the good man, the best form of government, government by law, the relation between private morality and public morality, Caesar and God, war and peace, the death of Socrates and Christ, obedience to the law, the justification of law and obedience. If we can urge and guide our students through such matter, be it a semester or many semesters, our task is begun and our immediate work finished. It is then up to them (and to us) to realize that all of this requires a second reading, at least a second reading and a reflection on the abidingness of human good and evil in the political forum.

Moreover, I believe that this is all intrinsically fascinating and, as it were, sells itself. I have the impression that our political situation is such that this generation of students who no longer have the enthusiasms (or hangups, depending on your viewpoint) of a few years ago and sobered by the legal way a president fell, are searching

for a political theory that puts them back into contact with classical and medieval political theory, with a theory that again enables them to think of politics as man ought to live it, not as he does live it. In a sense, all the revolutionary rhetoric of recent years with its din and blood was suddenly proved hollow and narrow in the acid test of an old morality and an old constitution. Such a program, then, I hope at least gives the student, and ourselves, an

outside chance, a chance to know the naiveté of making Plato and Aristotle primitives, to know why the Emperor Marcus Aurelius could see the importance of goodness while the Apostle Paul demanded his legal rights as a Roman citizen. No one should think that we have here a lasting panacea—Aristotle said to Plato, to know the good is not yet to be good—but rather a sober, exciting recognition of what can happen when man sets out to be just.

*Sabine, *History of Political Theory*, Holt; McDonald, *Western Political Theory*, Part I, Ancient and Medieval, Harcourt; Catlin, *Story of the Political Philosophers*, McGraw Hill; McCoy, *Structure of Political Thought*, McGraw Hill.

Perhaps it is well to suggest a few academic readings along the general lines I have been suggesting, though here, I am more interested in the matter itself rather than the justification for it:

1. C. Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," in *Apolitical Politics*, eds. McCoy and Playford, Crowell, 1967, pp. 12-37.

2. H. Greaves, "Political Theory Today," *Apolitical Politics*, pp. 232-46.

3. Leo Strauss, "What Is Political Philoso-

phy?" in *Contemporary Political Thought*, eds. Gould and Thursby, Holt, 1969, pp. 46-69.

4. Alfred Cobban, "Ethics and the Decline of Political Theory," *Ibid.*, pp. 289-303.

5. Isaiah Berlin, "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" *Ibid.*, pp. 328-357.

6. George W. Carey, "Beyond Parochialism in Political Science," *The Post-Behavioral Era*, pp. 37-53.

7. Leo Strauss, "Political Philosophy and the Crisis of Our Time," *Ibid.*, pp. 217-42.

8. Charles N. R. McCoy, "On the Revival of Classical Political Philosophy," *The Review of Politics*, April, 1973, pp. 161-79.

9. Ferdinand Mount, "The Recovery of Civility," *Encounter*, July, 1973, pp. 31-43.