The "E" Factors in History

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Equality, envy, egalitarianism, and empire—referred to here as the "E" factors—are key aspects of a historical syndrome within which civilizations have tended to evolve. Almost a century and a half ago Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that the belief in "the principle of equality" which he saw as the most fundamental and significant feature of American life, eventually would spread throughout the world. The dawning of that age of egalitarianism, which he believed was primarily motivated by envy, is now upon us. The most accurate term to describe the developing historical paradigm in which we find ourselves, and which encompasses the centralized, bureaucratic statism which characterizes our era, is empire.

Although equality and egalitarianism are often employed as if they were synonymous, the two terms actually represent two distinct concepts. In the literature on the subject, even critics usually do not oppose equality in two areas: equality of opportunity, in the sense that a society be without castes, and equality before the law. Opposition centers around the effort to extend the idea into other areas such as equality of income, property, and status. Some writers have tried to differentiate by referring to this extension of the concept as "radical" or "strict" egalitarianism. To avoid confusion, a basic conceptual distinction is made here between "equality," as of opportunity and before the law, which assumes that differences in income, property, and status may still exist, and "egalitarianism," the desire to level and thus eradicate such distinctions. Envy of differences created in a situation of increased equality is a significant factor in the demand for egalitarianism, which is the harbinger of empire.

The preoccupation of many twentieth century intellectuals with overseas imperialism, once a secondary definition of empire, has obscured its original meaning as "associated with the ideas of dictatorial power, highly centralized government, arbitrary methods of administration, and in general with ideas of Caesarism." An awareness of the tendency of the republics of the
ancient world to develop into empires was evident in the writings of Montesquieu, who influenced Edward Gibbon, John Adams, and Tocqueville.4 In America the debate over slavery and the ensuing Civil War diverted attention from this issue, although at least one political theorist, Alexander Stephens, the former vice-president of the Confederacy, noted the shift toward “centralism” and “empire.”5 In the controversy over imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, only a few of the anti-imperialists based their arguments upon an analysis of this internal process. Believing in the uniqueness of their “mission” and of the American experiment, Americans apparently felt they would somehow escape the tendency toward empire which had plagued other civilizations.6

Several European theorists came close to such an analysis of empire. Tocqueville’s “administrative centralization,” and what Max Weber called “rationalization,” were not only very similar concepts but close to the original definition of empire. As Robert A. Nisbet has observed:

Both saw conflict between bureaucracy and the democratic impulses that had helped to produce it. . . . [A]ny future despotism would emerge not primarily from individuals or groups but from the bureaucratic system per se.7

But the thinker who perhaps saw this process most clearly was the German philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler. In his view “Civilization,” “Caesarism,” and “Imperialism,” were all virtually synonymous concepts, or, as he stated it, “Imperialism is Civilization unadulterated.”8 It is one of the ironies of history that the West, in its increasing sense of power, would reject Spengler’s concept of “decline” as hopelessly in error. Only men literally “hooked” on power could fail to comprehend what is revealed by the most cursory reading of Spengler: that the decline is in freedom and creativity, while the power inherent in civilization is enormous.

Accompanying the development of the “E”-factor syndrome is a corresponding shift in the fundamental basis of value or law. Equality and egalitarianism, for example, however they are defined, are both secondary or derivative values and are justified as aspects of some final source of value or law. There are only three sources from which concepts of value or law can ultimately be derived. The first of these is supernaturalism, or supernatural law. A value or law is so because it is a part of God’s plan, communicated to the rest of mankind through his chosen instruments among them. A second source is natural law, or the laws of nature. Something is so because using reason, experience, and experimentation, it appears to be in the nature of things, that is, in conformity with nature as man understands it at any given point in time. Thirdly, there is positive law, or the laws of the state. A value or law is so simply because the state says so. In republican or democratic societies such decisions rest upon the will of the majority, which is regarded as the final arbiter as to what is right. This conception is often linked to both pragmatism and utilitarianism by suggesting that what is right is what seems to “work” for the majority, or provides the greatest happiness to the greatest number.

While all three concepts of value have existed in societies, and some thinkers have attempted to combine them in a coherent hierarchy, they tend to emerge into prominence in an order related to the “E” factors. Societies begin their development with a basic value system derived from supernatural law. The breakdown of feudalism and the growth of equality is accompanied by the development of natural law. Egalitarianism and empire are characterized by a growing acceptance of positive law and a
belief in the state as the ultimate source of all value and law. An understanding of the “E” factors and their relationship to the sources of value provides a basis from which to observe the development of the syndrome historically. The desire for equality has been a major factor leading to the breakdown of feudal relationships and the growth of a more open, mobile social structure which has characterized the emergence of the great civilizations throughout history. Functionally, such equality has meant the development of a relatively free market within which individuals could freely exchange ideas, goods, and services. Talent and intelligence do not, however, necessarily correlate with wealth and status, and not everyone is able to rise to the top of society. Although an overall increase in abundance raises the average considerably, the distance between the top and bottom may widen.

The egalitarianism latent within the thrust for equality now begins to assert itself. The egalitarian argument for “social justice,” articulated by religious leaders, secular intellectuals, and politicians to the rest of the society, is essentially a program for leveling income, property, and status and is fundamentally in conflict with the idea of equality. The continued demand for greater equality often serves as a convenient issue behind which egalitarians can disguise the real nature of their program.

The quest for justice is given impetus by the existence of many economic and social privileges derived from earlier, and in many cases continued, access to the state apparatus by various interests within the society. Some advocates of egalitarianism are probably sincere in their belief that a more equitable society will emerge from a state enforced program of leveling rather than through the curtailment of the power of the state. For many, however, egalitarianism simply masks an envious desire to replace those at the top, regardless of whether their position stems from privileges granted by the state or is the result of superior ability and/or hard work. At best, the egalitarian may concede that such success is due only to luck.

The significant question is, why do a large number of people come to believe that only through increased state intervention can justice be achieved? To a great extent this belief is due to the overwhelming acceptance of the state as the source of value and law. The society not only looks for solutions within the paradigm defined by the state, but also finds it difficult to consider the view that statism is at the heart of the problem.

The idea of the state emerges, as do certain aspects of the market economy, with the breakdown of feudalism. Statists often tend toward a policy which in the West has been called mercantilism, that is, a policy under which the state allows private property but those in control of the state use their power to regulate and direct the economy for the general welfare of the whole society. With or without monopolies, such a system is inherently unstable and tends toward corporate syndicalism, in which various economic interests utilize the state for their own ends. Criticism of the system emanates from three sources: those who wish to reform the system by returning to a responsible mercantilism; those who want to replace the system by going one step beyond mercantilism to the abolition of private ownership in many areas of the economy, thus instituting socialism; and finally, those who advocate the principles of the free market and who view the increased power of the state as the basic problem.

Democracy lends itself to the development of corporate syndicalism, for the election of representatives offers an easy op-
portunity for the economic interests to bring their influence and money to bear on the legislative process. This factor explains the persistent appeal of a “Caesarian” figure to would-be reformers, who will place himself above and beyond such interests. The ability of the economic interests to “buy” the mercantilist regulatory apparatus drives the reformers increasingly toward a socialist position.

The system thus moves toward empire. Centralized state power is viewed as essential to cope with the “evils” of the existing system. This development in turn suggests a bureaucracy to run the increasingly complex society. Both politicians and intellectuals see such a rationalized bureaucracy based upon merit as the way to control the power of the “vested interests.” In the final analysis, however, the aim of every bureaucracy is to protect itself above all else. A power struggle is generated between the ruler, the bureaucracy, the economic interests, and the people as a whole, often complicated by the military as a separate and distinct group within the state apparatus.

A crisis is reached when the economy can no longer produce enough to meet the voracious appetites of those groups which have access to the state. The classic case is agrarian China where the “squeeze” system led to crisis, revolt, and the initiation of a new cycle. The incredible abundance produced by industrialization may postpone the crisis, but it does not alter the fundamental contours of the process.

Intellectuals and politicians enjoy the idea of power and control. Like the mandarin, whose long fingernails demonstrated his distaste for, and ability to evade, physical labor, many politicians and intellectuals have an inherent dislike of the market economy with its emphasis on work, entrepreneurial risk, and money. Utilizing economic regulation, the rationalized bureaucracy promises not only security and an end to injustice, but also curtailment of the “brutish” and “anti-social” competitiveness which accompanies the free market. One of the great appeals of a rational bureaucracy is that, in eliminating competition, it also promises to eradicate envy. But, in cutting itself loose from the creativity of the free market, the bureaucracy has no way to define merit. At best a system of irrelevant symbols is established, as, for example, the Confucian examination or the Western doctorate. Such increasingly artificial elites either remain exclusive, denying equality and generating envy, or else they lower whatever standards remain in response to the continued egalitarian pressures. While bureaucracy ostensibly is initiated to promote equality it must inevitably lead to egalitarianism.

The contours of empire are thus inexorably interwoven with envy and egalitarianism. We can observe the entire “E”-factor syndrome as it developed in ancient Greece, Rome, China, and the modern West, especially in the United States.

The idea of equality permeated Greek society. As Alfred E. Zimmern noted:

Equal lands and equal rights were deeply rooted and persistent traditions of Greek life. . . . But equal lands never remain equal for long—least of all in a society in which the tradition of equality is strongly developed.11

While the supernaturalism derived from the gods never died out completely, it was subordinated or combined in the writings of the great philosophers and dramatists with the idea of natural law. Equality was tied to natural law where, for example, “in ‘The Phoenician Women’ Euripides describes equality, the foundation of democracy, as the law, manifest a hundredfold in nature, which man himself cannot escape.”12
The putative author, Pseudo-Xenophon, provided a fascinating glimpse of the process whereby equality was extended even within the institution of slavery:

Slaves... enjoy an extreme degree of license at Athens, where it is illegal to assault them and where the slave will not make way for you... The free proletariat... are not better dressed than the slaves... and... they allow the slaves to live in luxury and in some instances to keep up an imposing establishment.13

The expanding equality led to increasing differences of condition, which in turn provided the basis for a strong egalitarianism, in which envy was a significant factor.14 The movement culminated in a series of "shadowy" lawgivers who emerged throughout Greece, among whom Lycurgus of Sparta and Solon of Athens are the best known. "One feature we can trace in the work of all these lawgivers—an attempt to restore the unity of the state by restricting the use of wealth." And while Sparta's elaborate egalitarian formula prescribed the style of life even to the kind of meals to be eaten, Athens also had a rather rigorous code. Furthermore, "the aim in both cases was the same—to redress the inequalities of wealth... not merely... [through laws]... but by causing the rich to look as much like the poor as possible."15

Sparta's egalitarian solution was a monumental effort to turn back the clock of history. The measure of its success was that Sparta became the prototype of the economically stagnant, military state. Lycurgus believed the principal cause of Sparta's disorder "was the fact that the land was concentrating in the hands of the rich." He proposed to do away with "competitive money making... greed, and luxury." All land was thus turned over to the polis for redistribution and each Spartan given an equal share. As money was the root of all evil, "he caused all gold and silver coin to be withdrawn and he issued in its place a clumsy iron money, too heavy and of too little value to invite hoarding or other misuse" such as any extensive commercial activity.16

Under such circumstances any meaningful equality before the law or of opportunity in a relatively free market was severely curtailed. Even in Athens the supposed aristocracy defended by Plato and Aristotle was not a traditional one, "but temporary oligarchies having risen chiefly in reaction to democracies." They were simply "the wealthy who had seized the polis in self-defense. Oligarchs of this kind tried to keep the burden of the state on others and to keep for themselves its dignities and its profits."17 "Equality before the law," the slogan of the oligarchs, was an empty statement to mask their control of the state for their own interests.18

In The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides brilliantly recounted how the war was interwoven with the crisis of empire and the egalitarian thrust of the masses and their expansionistic, demagogic leaders. There is no more fitting description of the degradation of Athens, and of the arrogance of power and of statist, positive law which characterize empire, than the speech of the Athenians to the Melians before conquering them, exterminating all the males, selling into slavery the women and children, and resettling the area themselves. Unlike some empires, the Athenians at least did not try to justify their power by moral arguments, but concluded:

right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.19

Though their empire never had the opportunity and time to develop the degree of centralized bureaucracy which has
characterized most empires, in a real sense freedom was destroyed in the factionalized world of the Greeks long before their conquest by the Macedonians. Alexander the Great's empire was but a military conquest made possible by a long-developing internal process.

The long span of Roman history offers an even better example of the "E" factors in operation. In the ancient world, Rome was noted very early in its history for the emphasis placed on equality before the law. By the late Hellenistic age, this characteristic had resulted in a metamorphosis in the position of women. Equality for women extended beyond politics into economic life, and in some occupations such as plumbing women came to dominate. The rate of divorce increased enormously, and the power "of the pater familias was shaken to its foundations and eventually swept away altogether. The meek and henpecked Roman husband was already a stock comedy figure in the great days of the Second Punic War." This changing relationship led Cato the Censor to protest bitterly, "All other men rule over women; but we Romans, who rule all men, are ruled by our women." Equality had progressed to the point that by the late empire period a woman who married retained her property, "and, legally, the man had not even the right to enjoy the income from it." As Theodor Mommsen commented, "Caesar did what he could to repress permanently the fearful omnipotence of capital."

The achievements of the republic had been due to a great extent to the superiority of Roman law based upon, as Cicero had pointed out, natural law. In the empire, while the emperor attempted to link himself to the gods and thus to supernatural law, it was apparent to the more perceptive thinkers that "right" rested ultimately with Caesar, the army, and the bureaucracy.

The order and tranquillity of the first two centuries of the empire were purchased at a high cost in terms of creativity and freedom of expression. The intellectuals, as Tacitus and Lucian noted, became "dependent" upon the largesse of the government. The activities and brutality of the secret police increased, and many of the more capable men turned in despair to suicide as a means of escape. Though some inventions were developed, including the use of steam power, the government in effect bought out and shelved techniques which might have saved human labor but which also would have disturbed the economic structure of the society.

By the end of the second century the
economic difficulties of the empire increased. The welfare program, the volunteer army, the police, the informers, and the growing bureaucracy which was needed to administer all of the programs and regulations, placed a heavy tax burden on those with resources, but especially on the middle class. As M. Rostovtzeff observed, “One of the most striking phenomena in economic life was the rapid depreciation of the currency and a still more rapid increase in prices.” If silver depreciated, gold literally disappeared. A system of “fiduciary” money was introduced. It had almost no value and was accepted only because the state forced people to do so.

Taxation and confiscation bore down especially on the cities where economic development was centered. “Naturally the main sufferers . . . were those who belonged to the class of well-to-do, but not very rich, men and those who were comparatively honest.” In a passage that reminds one of the plot of *Atlas Shrugged*, written later by another Russian emigré, Ayn Rand, Rostovtzeff noted that “Such men [the upper middle class] lost their property, were degraded, and took to flight, living in hiding all over the country.” Those who succeeded within such a system were the rich and unscrupulous men who had the means and cunning to bribe the officials and to found their prosperity on the misfortune of their poorer and more honest colleagues.”

About the only glimmer of hope was that by the fourth century the police and state apparatus had become so inept that it was fairly easy to “hide” and to return from exile.

The state used the army, increasingly composed of half-barbarian peasants, to crack down on the urban, entrepreneurial class which was responsible for much of the economic productivity. Unfortunately, however, the egalitarian army itself became difficult to manage. “The driving forces,” Rostovtzeff held, “were envy [italics added] and hatred,” but the army had no positive programme.” The army came to feel it shared little in the wealth often acquired and defended through its efforts and the deaths of many of its soldiers. As a result, “the dull submissiveness which had for centuries been the typical mood” of the peasant-soldier “was gradually transformed into a sharp feeling of hatred and envy” toward the urban inhabitants. When brought in to quell an urban riot, the army often wrecked more havoc than it prevented.

“Envy and hatred” of the city were the ultimate causal factors in Rostovtzeff’s “thesis that the antagonism between the city and the country was the main driving force of the social revolution of the third century,” which destroyed the internal structure of the empire. Such an analysis, minus any reference to envy and favoring a victory of the forces of the countryside, is put forward today by many revolutionaries in the poor nations and was especially evident in a well-publicized speech of some years ago by the Chinese leader, Marshal Lin Piao.

The excesses of the Roman peasant-soldiery did not lead to the triumph of that inchoate group. The system established by the Emperor Diocletian, who “raised himself from slavery to the purple at thirty-nine,” returned some semblance of order.

If, however, the republic was the first act in the Roman drama, and the empire the second, although the term, empire, might still be employed, this third act was structurally different and can perhaps best be described as an “oriental despotism.” The new ruling bureaucracy very soon established close relations with “the strongest and richest” part of the upper class. “The class which was disappearing was the middle class, the active and thrifty citizens of the thousand cities in the empire, who

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formed the link between the upper and lower classes.” Little else is heard of this class except that “[i]t became more and more oppressed and steadily reduced in numbers.” Thus, “[a] movement which was started by envy and hatred and carried on by murder and destruction,” Rostovtzeff concluded, “ended in such depression of spirit that any stable conditions seemed to the people preferable to unending anarchy.”

There were many who accepted the final collapse of the empire “without heartfelt regret,” and others who had visited among the Huns and considered their society “far better” than that of Rome.

Even China, a society some have thought devoid of such notions as equality and egalitarianism, was not exempt from the development of the “E”-factor syndrome. By the time of the Ch’in dynasty the old feudal aristocracy had been eliminated. Confucianism, Legalism, and Taoism were all efforts to cope with the breakdown of the old order.

The pressure for equality of opportunity and before the law was a factor in this process. While both Confucianism and Legalism accepted the state, “they disagreed . . . on the question of raising the law to universality [the Legalist view]. . . . It was not legality itself which divided the two parties, but equality before the law.” Both systems had moved beyond a value orientation based upon supernatural law. Confucianism was close to natural law in its emphasis on living in “harmony” with nature, while Legalism was the epitome of positive law. Both these statist philosophies were opposed to Taoism which, although it also functioned within a framework of natural law in stressing the idea of “the way,” rejected the idea of the state. Etienne Balazs has described the thinking of Taoists like Pao Ching-yen as “libertarian anarchism.” Unfortunately, the enormous power exerted by the state pushed the best of the Taoist thinkers toward an increasingly nihilistic outlook.

The equality before the law promised by the Legalists was an important factor in the triumph of that idea and the unification of the country and establishment of the empire under Shih Huang Ti. A constant demand at the founding of a new dynasty, as the cycle was repeated over the centuries, was that land be redistributed to the farmers.

To whatever extent this redistribution was carried out, differences soon became apparent as some men managed to accumulate more wealth than others, either through their own efforts or through access to the state apparatus. The resulting envy also reflected the tension between the city and the countryside which can be seen in other civilizations as well. The agrarian orientation of the Confucian emphasized his “gentlemanly” dislike of a free market economy. This dislike was especially true of a radical reformer such as Wang An Shih, whose massive program of state regulation was a response to the urbanization and growing market economy of the eleventh century.

In his famous “Ten Thousand Word Memorial,” Wang attacked the increasing materialism and affluence of the society. Unfortunately, not only did the poor “envy” the rich, they also sought to “emulate” them. His solution, which was never fully carried out, would have meant a managed economy far beyond the already extensive state control, monopolies, and ownership. In a massive plan for egalitarian leveling, Wang wanted to inspect all goods and to punish those persons producing “articles of a useless, extravagant or immoral character.” Through increased taxation many artisans and merchants engaged in making and exchanging such articles would “be forced into the fields.”
and there would thus "be no lack of food." One is impressed not only by the sheer time span of the Chinese empire, but the manner in which the Confucian bureaucracy kept control, despite the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties and barbarian incursions. The complexity of China's riverine civilization was one factor in this continuity, and the examination system was another. In theory, the examination system offered equality of opportunity for all those with sufficient ability to enter into the ruling hierarchy. In practice, this was not true because it took years of subsidized study to master the literary classics which formed the core of the examination. Egalitarian pressure was probably the major factor in the gradual watering down of standards and the eventual introduction of a procedure whereby degrees could simply be purchased.

The Confucian leadership, however, was not without its divisions, which approximate views in the West. Radicals such as Wang used the envy and egalitarianism present in the society as a means to move toward a virtually complete state socialism. A second element reflected a typically mercantilist desire to control the economy for the good of the bureaucracy itself, and a third group resembled the corporate syndicalist politician as the representative of an economic interest, in that its members sought to use their position to advance the fortune of the larger family clan which had supported the study necessary for the examination.

Balazs has demonstrated the extent to which, beneath a rhetoric of humanism, the Confucian bureaucracy functioned as a system of power. The bureaucracy took a large portion of the economic wealth produced from an essentially agrarian base and, in the process, of course, helped to hasten the crisis which usually resulted in the establishment of a new dynasty and a new cycle. An enormous network of informers and police was necessary to control the society. Under such conditions, as in Rome, freedom and creativity languished. In despair, the great historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, in his last will and testament "denounced the autocratic state for the humiliations inflicted upon its subjects, and discussed with great lucidity the problem of whether to commit suicide under a despotism."

From this perspective of the history of China the present regime is not a departure from, but rather a continuation of, the past, but with a heavier emphasis upon the Legalist tradition.

The contours of Western civilization are familiar to most of us and, with the prior examples of other societies before us, the development of the "E" factors can be outlined rather quickly. Western society began its development around a value system based upon Christian, supernatural law. With the decline of feudalism, the emergence of a market economy, and the rise of the national state, both natural law and positive law received new emphasis, and the three sources of law were often found in various combinations.

Both a desire for equality and egalitarianism can be observed among the groups pressing for social change from the peasant rebellions of the late medieval period to the revolutions of the modern era. Tocqueville's major insight was his realization that America, because of a relative absence of feudal institutions, had suddenly advanced toward equality before the older, European nations. In the years since he wrote, the United States has traveled far down the road toward egalitarianism and empire.

While a description of these developments in detail exceeds the scope of this essay, some aspects are worthy of consideration. Perhaps the most significant de-
development which could bring into question the whole statist paradigm is the economic crisis which now confronts the United States. Having failed in its effort to tie the international monetary system to the dollar, the government is finding out that the cost of keeping order throughout the world is more than it can afford. However, empire in the sense of an increasingly arbitrary, centralized bureaucratic statism continues.

Some of the ways in which egalitarianism affects American society are quite subtle. Commenting on the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881, Alexander Stephens attributed it to a growing belief that everyone had a right to succeed in business and education. The “ambitions” of many had been “stimulated in excess” of their capacity. Failure often resulted in a resort to violence and a desperate search for notoriety as a partial substitute for success. Arthur Bremer, who shot Governor George Wallace of Alabama in 1972, is a rather pathetic example of this frustrated egalitarianism. From his Diary, we learn that it mattered little to Bremer whom he shot; a more important person simply meant more publicity. Throughout the Diary are four-letter words and a constant reference to “failure.” The degree of self-hatred is overpowering. It seems likely in this epoch of egalitarianism that increasing frustration and violence can only result when many individuals find they cannot achieve the success which egalitarians promised as the “right” of everyone.

In an area such as education, failure can be averted simply by lowering standards. This debasement lies at the heart of the present crisis in American education but is seldom commented upon. At the university level poor schools, often state supported and easily subjected to egalitarian political pressure, drive out good schools in a kind of application of Gresham’s law in the area of education. Egalitarian pressures from students, who demand the right to evaluate their teachers, and from peers, who evaluate each other, push the system toward bureaucratization in which free thought and creativity are undermined. In the United States governmental pressure for increased egalitarianism has resulted in formula with quotas for various “minority” groups such as women and blacks. Such policies are a denial of traditional American notions of equality of opportunity and before the law.

The arbitrary power of the centralized governmental bureaucracy permeates American life at all levels, stifling freedom and initiative. The director of the Patent Office, for example, recently reported that for the first time there has been a marked drop off in the rate at which Americans are patenting new ideas and inventions. One suspects this decline is not due to Americans suddenly becoming less intelligent, but that the structure of governmental regulation has grown so great it is discouraging the development and application of new ideas. This trend comes, unfortunately at a time when government has created or exacerbated problems such as pollution, solutions to which will demand freedom and creativity unfettered by a rigid, bureaucratic statism.

Can the historical drift toward egalitarianism and empire which has plagued other civilizations be reversed in the West? Perhaps the best hope lies ironically in the gathering economic crisis now facing many of the formerly advanced nations whose economies are stagnating under the heavy weight of massive programs of subsidy, defense, welfare, and bureaucracy. The continued inability of the state to solve such problems may yet lead to a reassessment of the whole situation in which natural law and a free market would take on new relevance in the struggle for human freedom.
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All of the aspects mentioned here are brilliantly discussed in Chester Starr, *Civilization and the Caesars* (New York: 1965).


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