

Otto Strasser and National Socialism

PAUL GOTTFRIED

ON MAY 30, 1930, a burly Bavarian, who since 1926 had been spreading National Socialism in Prussia, met in Berlin with the South-German leader of his movement. The topic which they discussed was the place of revolutionary socialism in the Nazi party. After a long and acerbic quarrel, the two men parted. The Bavarian condemned his fellow Nazi, for "selling out to the bourgeoisie"; and the recipient of his reproach attacked his accuser for insubordination.¹ The refractory Nazi, Otto Strasser, went further, however, in asserting his independence from the most powerful personality in his group, Adolph Hitler. On July 4, 1930, he organized his own wing of the National Socialist party: *Die Kampfgemeinschaft revolutionärer Nationalsozialisten*. A hodgepodge of displaced veterans, former stormtroopers, and even noblemen, this camarilla, which Strasser also called the "Black Front," proclaimed itself "a school of officers and non-commissioned officers of the German revolution."²

Both Strasser and his movement, how-

ever, soon discovered the brutality of their opponent on the Right. Hitler, aided by his bourgeois contacts, industrialists, and financiers, had completed his rise to power by 1934; and on June 30, he purged the Nazi party of all potential threats to his power.³ The Brown Shirts were one victim of this bloodletting; former members of the Black Front provided another. Otto Strasser, who had fled from Germany in 1933, watched from Prague this slaughter which claimed his own brother. Soon after he wrote a book, *The German Saint Bartholomew's Night*, which combined praise for the fallen National Socialists with seething invectives against Hitler. Strasser ended his narrative by expressing the hope that the example of his slain comrades might yet inspire a real German revolution.⁴

This prayer never came to fruition. Hitler remained in power until foreign nations had battered his country; and his National Socialist antagonist, Otto Strasser, suffered the plight of another idealogue, Leon Trotsky. Like the enemy of Stalin, he too lived

out his days in protest against a triumphant competitor who he firmly believed had betrayed revolutionary ideals.⁵

Otto Strasser was born in Windsheim, Bavaria, the son of a minor civil official, on September 10, 1897.⁶ His two older brothers, Gregor and Paul, both attended a university; and Otto too was heading for a professional vocation in law when the first world war broke out. The young Bavarian spent four years on the Western Front; he was wounded several times and finally received the rank of lieutenant. Like many others of his generation Strasser was deeply affected by the experience of the war. Between 1914 and 1918 the German nation had seemed more united than during any period in its more recent past. Patriots of all regions, classes, and faiths had marched together to the front where they had fought for the fatherland against its enemies.⁷ Their valor notwithstanding, Germany had lost the war; and Strasser returned to Bavaria, still on crutches, in the fall of 1918.

He returned to arms almost at once. On November 8, 1918, a republican revolution unseated the last king of Bavaria, Louis III of Wittelsbach; a few days later Kurt Eisner, a young Jewish socialist, seized control of the government in Munich. Strasser joined a corps of volunteers headed by General von Epp in crushing the radical regime. And yet, in 1920, Strasser, after moving to Berlin, vocally supported the socialist government there when a rightist politician, Wolfgang Kapp, tried with his followers to topple it. These actions, according to one biographer, show no inconsistency in his conduct. Though a social democrat in Bavaria, Strasser held no brief for the revolutionary rule of Eisner. In Prussia, where the Left took over by orderly elective means, he opposed any attempt by the military to intervene.⁸

This explanation of Strasser's apparent

vacillation is only partially true. In spite of his socialist posture, he had never accepted the Marxist notion of class conflict. There was no unbridgeable gulf that lay between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; for both, in his view, belonged to the same cultural and spiritual entity, the German nation. Further, Strasser, unlike the Communists, disdained a dictatorship of the workers as much as a capitalist monopoly. Both expressed the egotism of classes which had ceased to concern themselves with the common well-being. Neither Communists nor capitalists understood what 1914 should have made obvious to all: that, henceforth, Germans had to put away their individual ambitions and social resentments and serve their people as a whole. The Marxist revolutionaries in Munich could not satisfy the yearning for national solidarity which lay behind this vision. Nor did the social democratic functionaries in Prussia bring any lasting satisfaction to its author.

Thus Strasser soon became alienated from both. In the early 1920s, the young nationalist, while a law student in Berlin, attended meetings of the "June Club": coterie of German patriots who were critical of both parliamentarianism and Marxism.⁹ Strasser also contributed to the club's magazine, *Gewissen*, along with such outstanding spokesmen as Moeller van den Bruck, Eduard Staedtler, and Heinrich von Gleichen.¹⁰ It was then that Otto and his brother Gregor became deeply involved in the Nazi movement; and in October 1925, they presented a conference of party officials with their controversial "Bamberg Program." Designed to introduce "real German socialism," this plan called for the nationalization of industries and for a more equitable distribution of farm lands.¹¹ Essentially it reaffirmed the socialist elements of the "Twenty-Five Points," framed by Hitler and two early Nazis, Gottfried Feder and Anton Drexler, in the fall of 1919.¹²

Like Point Seventeen of this document, the Bamberg Program demanded the confiscation of all land belonging to the nobility without compensation. For Hitler who was bent on conciliating the Junker class and who had voted against a similar proposal in the Reichstag of 1925, the Twenty-Five Points had become a source of embarrassment. But the Fuehrer wished desperately to retain the radicals in his movement, so he grudgingly gave the Strassers their way.

For Hitler the Bamberg Program was a distasteful concession, but for the Strasser brothers this plan meant the beginning of German socialism. The *Kampfverlag*, the press which the two men ran for the party in Berlin, announced in its pamphlets the advent of a new social order. Naturally there was no place here for either capitalists or Bolsheviks; the Germany conjured out of this dream of unity would integrate all patriots into the life of the nation. In December 1925, the Strassers offered the following observation concerning Marxism:

The communist class struggle is merely the process whereby a deprived group succeeds to the wealth of its oppressor and becomes itself a privileged order. No reconciliation takes place here; what occurs is the substitution of one form of mastery by another.¹³

A similar separation of interests, notes Gregor (on July 25, 1925), prevails in most parliamentary states, for there parties serve only as fronts for the social and economic powers which control them.¹⁴ In such a system one finds neither national unity nor a sense of sacrifice that enables men to act "out of like interest and like purpose." There was an alternative, however, to Marxism and Western parliamentarianism: a socialism that was "identical with true nationalism and equally opposed to a privileged bourgeoisie and a privileged prole-

tariat."¹⁵ Though the publications of the *Kampfverlag* never defined this entity at any length, in 1931 Otto Strasser completed a work which did: *The Structure of German Socialism*.

This study began with an elaborate and fanciful anthropology. Nations like individuals, observed Strasser echoing a view posed by thinkers from Aristotle to Spengler, were living bodies. Each one passed through a cycle of youth, maturity, and senescence, and each possessed its own physical and cultural peculiarities.¹⁶ A "people," properly so called, was an "amalgam of races" whose members shared both biological kinship and the same historical and geographical conditioning. At present, Europe comprised about four or five such groups who were held together by an overarching spiritual and racial unity.¹⁷ A people was also a nation if, like the Germans under the impact of the first world war, they had achieved a consciousness of their own identity. Neither nations nor peoples, however, operated as entirely free and spontaneous units; for both were subject to what Strasser styled the "law of triune polarity."

According to this theory European history oscillated between two poles: a liberal and a conservative. Whereas the former was inextricably enmeshed with the "ego impulse," the latter brought forth a sense of community.¹⁸ Both egotism and communalism became manifest in the same three sets of relationships: in the material sphere, in man's connection with objects; in the social realm, in one's interaction with other beings; and in metaphysical pursuits, in one's treatment of concepts. During a liberal epoch (the present one beginning about 1500 with the extreme individualism of the Renaissance), economic life became divested of moral restraints; society assumed a chaotic and precarious character as institutions which once brought a unity started

to dissolve. Meanwhile, the human mind constructed a materialistic world-view which explained the religious skepticism characteristic of European culture since the seventeenth century.¹⁹

The ages in which the "we" or conservative principle dominated favored "socialism, nationalism, and popular idealism." For Germany the transition started in August 1914, when the convulsion of war welded together its people as never before. Strasser viewed the rise of Marxism in Europe as an historical anomaly. For although emphasizing socialism, which was peculiar to conservative times, the Communists rejected nationalism and embraced a philosophy which was basically materialistic.²⁰ On the other hand, Strasser, though suspicious of Marxist errors, had no call to defend capitalism. Like the Communists he believed that the capitalist economy was historically passé and tottering beneath the wages of its own sins. The mastery of Western techniques would soon enable such formerly unindustrialized countries as India, China, and Brazil to compete against European trade. Both Japan and Russia already possessed sufficient technology for large-scale industrialization. Meanwhile American trade made inroads all over the world. And the boycott of Western commodities by nationalists in India and elsewhere ruined European markets even more.²¹ Unfortunately this change of events had not elicited a growing concern among countries for social alternatives, though never was the necessity for creative economics greater than at present. In Germany, industrialists like the Thyssens and Krupps, argued Strasser, were carving out a financial empire despite the growth of poverty and unemployment in most sectors of their society.²²

The Structure of German Socialism abounds with suggestions on how to adapt the German economy to the nation's needs.

These range from the imposition of huge tariffs to curtail the import of foreign commodities to the investment of property in the community and its assignment to worthy individuals as "fiefs."²³ None of these proposals, we might note, originated with Strasser. They were modelled on a previously constructed economic system, autarky, which organized wealth and the means of production around the principle of national self-sufficiency. The German philosopher, J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), in his tract *Der geschlossene Handelstaat* (1799), first advocated the gradual withdrawal of Germany from her commercial relations with her neighbors as a means of achieving economic independence and of regenerating the national spirit. Certainly by the time that Strasser aired such thoughts, they had become common coin among German rightists.²⁴

There was another proposal which Strasser made long popular on the German Right: the abolition of parliamentary government. Political parties which appeared to him as self-seeking cabals, had no future in the new Germany. This would be ruled by vocational councils without the interference of party officials.²⁵ Education and law would likewise be cleansed of their liberal taint in the order which Strasser conceived. Schools would aim no longer at the "mere transmission of facts." This "depersonalized" approach to learning would be replaced by one which "cultivated comradeship" and "incorporated the young into the fabric of the nation."²⁶ Further, the resurrected fatherland would no longer abide a single legal code like the one to which all Germans were presently subject. During the Middle Ages there was a superabundance of laws which enveloped the German Empire: each city and region had its own code as did every class and occupation. But during the late fifteenth century the Holy Roman Emperors introduced

Roman imperial law as a means of bringing their German subjects more completely under their sway.²⁷ The trend toward written codification continued in modern times. This Strasser attributed largely to liberal jurists who mistakenly identified rigid and uniform laws with legal equality. National socialism, understanding the perils of this pedantry, would revive Medieval concepts of justice and transfer all legal suits to people's courts.²⁸

Despite the centrality of these ideas in Strasser's thought, his confrontation with Hitler greatly affected his attitudes. The book, *Germany Tomorrow*, written in 1940, indicates a basic shift in his philosophical outlook. This work must be seen in the context of the German resistance to Hitler in which Strasser played an active role even in exile. Indeed the underlying assumption of *Germany Tomorrow* is the reality of a successful revolt against Nazism with the Black Front at its head.²⁹ Indulging his passion for wishful thinking, Strasser also imposed a second conceit upon his readers: a new Germany led by his followers. The Black Front, after giving the Nazis their desserts, would make peace with all of Germany's neighbors. It would compensate the Poles and Czechs for the loss of their German-speaking regions by yielding them territories conquered from Communist Russia.³⁰ The Black Front would also work for a reestablished League of Nations which would be given an army to ensure the maintenance of international peace. Strasser, in *Germany Tomorrow*, abandons the principles of autarky. Instead of exalting the self-sufficiency of peoples, he calls for the removal of all European custom barriers and the unfettered pursuit of free trade.³¹

Notwithstanding the differences between *Germany Tomorrow* and *The Structure of German Socialism*, there are lines of continuity that lead from one to the other. The

war against the Junkers, a matter of grave concern to the young Strasser, becomes in his later tracts a full-scale crusade against greed and injustice. It was the Prussian mentality that he saw triumphant in the "hysterical militarism" of the Hitlerian epoch. In 1941, in the *Prussian Eagle over Germany*, he advised the dismemberment of the Prussian state and the political degradation of its Junker masters.³² In *Germany Tomorrow* Strasser also advocated the restoration of German medieval areas of government, *Landschaften* (Brandenburg, Hesse, Saxony, Hanover, etc.), and the return of political power to these territorial units. The old demand for the expropriation of landed estates likewise reappears in Strasser's later works; and almost as a ritualistic carry-over from the past, he resumes his denunciation of the industrial magnates.³³ One also catches a rasping echo in *Germany Tomorrow* of the anti-Semitism which permeated the publications of the *Kampfverlag*. Gone, however, are the imputations of these earlier polemics that the Jews had betrayed the fatherland to the capitalists or Bolsheviks. Strasser did challenge the right of Jews to equal citizenship, but only on the grounds that they were not yet thoroughly German or Christian. Unlike the Nazis, however, he was willing to give them the opportunity to assimilate—that is, to convert to Christianity.³⁴

Since the second world war the perils of Statism have haunted Strasser's thought as completely as anti-Bolshevism and anti-Prussianism before. In 1965, he produced a study, *Fascism*, which unmasks the adversary on every page. The essence of Fascism, we learn, is neither aberrant nationalism nor a counter-revolutionary imitation of Bolshevism. Both patriotism and counter-revolution provide merely the veil of rhetoric behind which the state conspires to extend its power. Strasser was obviously grinding an axe here; but the extent of his

prejudice becomes apparent only at the end of his treatise. Then one discovers:

Whoever praises and wishes to strengthen the state, he is a fascist; whoever wants to give the state new tools and to make its bureaucracy mightier, he is a fascist.³⁵

One is hardly astounded by this definition in view of the argumentative tone of the work from which it comes. Nor can one resist a smile when Strasser proposes his theory of "solidarism" as an alternative to the modern state. Several times before we have read his presentation of this idea. Again we are offered a decentralized government which is controlled by vocational councils and which stresses social integration rather than equality. This time, however, allowances are made for free speech and the unrestricted pursuit of culture.³⁶ These programs have confronted us so often before that by now one might wonder about the cast of mind behind them.

Armin Mohler, the secretary of Ernst Juenger, in his study *The Conservative Revolution in Germany (1918-1932)*, distinguishes two types of anti-liberals on the modern political Right: the conservative who performs a holding action against change; and the "neo-conservative" nationalist who, like Strasser, assumes a vitalistic, though pessimistic view of the world.³⁷ The conservative, faced by the breakdown of cultural and social cohesion, tries to guard traditional life against an uncertain future. For the neo-conservative both the challenge and response are different. The crust of custom has already been broken, and men have despaired of the values and symbols of old.³⁸

Ernst Juenger, in his novel *Upon the Marble Cliffs*, describes the malaise of people in ages of transition. Tossed between exhausted truths and unborn redemption, they grasp desperately at one of two hopes: "refined nihilism" or "wild anarchy." The

outcome of one is "desolation," the promise of the other a return to the "primeval forest."³⁹ Civilization, for the neo-conservative, has lost its staying power. Sickened from within by mass culture and philistine pretension, it must resist from without the disintegrating current of Marxist revolution.

Juenger, Erich Remarque, and other German writers of the twenties have traced the emergence of these views among the intellectuals of their era. Growing up in the gilded age of William II, young men underwent the agonies of war only to return to a society still divided between a smug bourgeoisie and a sullen, but potentially vicious, working class. In the face of such misery, many Germans sought to transform their country, to renew it spiritually while avoiding the "refined nihilism" of the old ruling stratum and the "wild anarchy" of the radical Left. Mere preservation was, however, insufficient for this purpose. The neo-conservative, steeped in the prophecies of Friedrich Nietzsche and of that eloquent and pessimistic historian, Jacob Burckhardt, considered civilization *in extremis*.⁴⁰ There was no turning back in an age of democratic revolution. The masses would never surrender the rights they had wrested from the aristocracy in government or from the educated classes as arbiters of culture. The cheapening of spiritual and artistic life which the neo-conservative saw all around them and which like Nietzsche and Burckhardt they identified with liberal and democratic values, could not be halted by a retreat into the past. History itself worked against such an option. Not only did the present structure of society bar the way back, but the cataclysm of the War upset whatever certainties either the conservatives or liberals had cherished before.⁴¹ But the war seemed a visitation upon a decadent culture which also brought regeneration. It reeducated an atomized people to

communal values and served as a bridge to what, for Strasser and others, were sources of collective redemption: nationalism and socialism.

The emphasis of the neo-conservative upon community and integration did not, however, leave him uncritical of the state. To be sure, some administrative apparatus would be required to implement social reforms, but the neo-conservative wished to distinguish between means and end. The state was an institution which would assist in the salvation of Germans, but only if it conformed to two conditions. The government had to reflect the values and impulses of the nation. And it would be bound by the needs of the German people who, through their various councils would control its functioning. The neo-conservative despised a state which seemed manipulated by bureaucrats or which divided its sovereignty among political factions. Such governments ceased to represent the collective spirit; they functioned as divisive forces and reasserted the egotism of the few against the unity of the folk.⁴²

This excursus into the political philosophy of neo-conservatism should illuminate the seeming vagaries which run through the writing of Strasser. His ideas pass through a multitude of phases; and, no doubt, a cynic, knowing that he is dealing with a political personality, would ascribe these alterations to crass opportunism. But I decline to make such a judgment. Strasser's dogged resistance to Hitler indicates that he is more than a devious politician. No, the cause of his mutability as a thinker lies elsewhere. At the risk of appearing paradoxical, let me state that socialism and nationalism, liberty and internationalism are all of a piece in Strasser's world-view. The apparent changes in his thought involve shifts of emphasis rather than anything more concrete.

The point of departure for most of his

theoretical work is a crisis in European history which totally reshaped the social life of man. In *The Structure of German Socialism*, this upheaval is associated with the breakdown of the nation as a culturally integrated whole; in the study *Fascism*, the crucial event becomes the rise of the modern state and its conversion into an instrument of spiritual oppression.⁴³ In both accounts, however, a similar development is postulated. An ordered and unified society gives way to a confused one; this process is abetted by a government which breaks up communal ties in order to enslave individuals. Individualism is an illusion which the modern state fosters in order to render men helpless before it. And liberal slogans also mask the chicanery of businessmen and profiteers who are the most fervent advocates of "free trade." The rise of capitalism is intimately bound up with the emergence of the modern state; one drew upon the other in overthrowing the political and economic restraints which held Medieval society together.⁴⁴

But the rule of the capitalist and bureaucrat would soon be ended; for a revolt against both was already in course. We have discussed the convergence of forces which Strasser viewed as a threat to modern liberal society. Of all the powers which challenged this order, national socialism seemed the one most fit to succeed it. The radical Left, more specifically the Marxists, provided, according to the neo-conservative, only a spurious alternative to Western capitalism; for implicit in the ideology were liberal values writ large. Equality was the principle with which the modern state set man loose from his ordered, communal relations; and it received its *reductio ad absurdum* under Marxism. This demanded a government, explains Strasser, which, in the name of revolutionary ideals, would reduce all to the same condition of life. Even the cultural differences among people

would be effaced as communism would abolish all national distinctions.

Strasser rejected communism, however, not only as programmatically unsound, but as historically untrue. Like liberalism it rested on the assumption of human progress in time. Every social and moral development through which men passed, the Marxists taught, constituted an advance over whatever had preceded it. The neo-conservative challenged this conviction and held instead to a cyclical view of history.⁴⁵ Society wavered inexorably between periods of unity and those of dissolution. The liberal capitalist phase through which the West had just moved, exemplified the second type of epoch; but the erosion of communal solidarity which it had brought, was bound to pass. Strasser foresaw a return to the medieval way of life, or at least to principles which he had abstracted from his examination of the Middle Ages. Hierarchy, religion, and an agrarian society, these are the institutions which shaped the contours of neo-conservative nationalism.⁴⁶ But such forces also harked back to a prenatalist age. Indeed, nationalism, as Strasser defined it throughout his writings, stood in dialectical relationship to a whole range of political and economic phenomena identified with modern Europe, from the industrial revolution to the secularization of society. It was the nation which supplied an integral culture that allowed men to resist the effect of these changes.

Nevertheless, nationalism, though an antidote to cultural dissolution, was not an end in itself. Thus Strasser, in *Europe Tomorrow*, a biography of Thomas Masaryk, father of the Czech republic, praised his subject for reconciling two significant, but often conflicting forces: nationalism and humanitarianism.⁴⁷ He also rhapsodized about a grand synthesis of the universal and particular and foresaw an age in which countries would come together to erect a

federation dedicated to "national liberty, social justice, and European cooperation." People would learn the "futility of coercion," and the principles of national socialism would regulate the intercourse of states and the relationships within all countries.⁴⁸

The burden of our study has been to explore an aspect of Nazi ideology abandoned by its leaders even before Hitler's accession to power. This was neo-conservatism whose outlook stressed both revolution and restoration. Otto Strasser is one of this cause's most active exponents, and his writings reflect its social vision. They also enable us to challenge an assumption with which scores of scholars have approached the German Right. This is the belief that a nationalism, both violent and bigoted, lay behind the formation of modern German conservatism.⁴⁹ The thought of Strasser, as it developed both before and after the second world war, suggests a more overriding concern than the German state. It is a general crisis in European culture to which he directs the attention of his reader.

Whether one agrees with either his diagnosis or cure is, for our purpose, beside the point. Strasser and his like are significant even if their views do not always seem plausible. Because of them it is difficult to explain anti-liberal attitudes in Germany with reference to chauvinism and anti-Westernism alone. At the core of this rejection of liberalism lay occasionally more positive elements: an anxiety about the individual's estrangement from society and the desire to reabsorb him into a community. The essential weakness of Strasser concerns more his work as a politician than as a thinker. The evocation of prejudice and xenophobia, though not basic to his philosophy, did become the weapons whereby he fought his enemies in the twenties. And the glorification of political violence in his early tracts seem ludicrous as well as

crude. However, the civilizational concerns which underlay his career cast a better light upon the whole. They also indicate the

need for a reappraisal of the appeal which rightist movements have had in Germany and elsewhere during our century.

¹For Strasser's account of this confrontation which, unhappily, is the only one available, see his *Hitler and I*, trans. G. D. Mossbach (Boston, 1940).

²*Ibid.*, pp. 120-26. Black, the color of the flag carried by the Swabian peasants during their uprising of 1525, became identified in the works of the nationalist, Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925), with the awakening of the German people. See especially *Das dritte Reich* (Hamburg, 1931).

³Karl Paetel, a friend of Strasser's and a rightist revolutionary during the twenties and thirties ascribes the defeat of the socialist and anti-Hitlerian elements among the Nazis to their ideological hairsplitting. National Socialist critics of Hitler, like the aristocratic publicist, Count Reventlow, and Strasser's own brother Gregor, refused to leave the party with the organizer of the Black Front; for whatever their differences with the Fuehrer, they believed that they could achieve more of their socialist program under his leadership than by entrusting their cause to fragmented sectarians. Cf. K. O. Paetel, *Versuchung oder Chance?* (Goettingen, 1965), pp. 29-32, 208-217.

⁴Cf. Strasser's *Die deutsche Bartholomauesnacht* (Zurich, 1935), especially pp. 234-38; and his pamphlet *Sozialistische Revolution oder faschistischer Krieg?* (Prague, 1935).

⁵This analogy, which is not my own, comes from the title of an article by Alfred Werner, "The Trotsky of the Nazi Party" (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, No. XL, Jan.-Apr., 1951). Despite its piquant title, however, Werner's essay is too violently biased against Strasser to be of scholarly benefit.

⁶There are only two substantial biographies of the early Strasser, and both have come from the pen of his British apologist, Douglas Reed; see *Nemesis* (London, 1952) and *The Prisoner of Ottawa* (London, 1953).

⁷The front as a school for militant nationalists and "heroic nihilists," is a subject lyrically treated in the novels of Ernst Juenger (1895-), the guiding light of the "Front Generation." This was the name taken by veterans of the first world war who, unhappy with the social inertia of Weimer democracy, called for a "new German reality" in politics and culture. For an excellent discussion of this mood of revolt, one should see Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism* (Princeton, 1957).

⁸See Reed's *Nemesis*, pp. 10-15.

⁹Cf. K. von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism*, pp. 133-37.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, also Fritz Stern, *Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 185-245.

¹¹For a discussion of this program, see O. E. Schueddekopf's *Linke Leute von Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 193-97.

¹²For a copy of these points, see either Schueddekopf's work or D. Reed's *Nemesis*, p. 242.

¹³See the compilation of editorials from the *Kampfverlag* in the book *Kampf um Deutschland* (Munich, 1931), pp. 164-66.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 62

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁶The section from *The Structure of German Socialism* employed above appear in a translation by Eden and Cedar Paul of Strasser's chief works: see *Germany Tomorrow* (London, 1940), p. 119.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 120-22.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 124

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 129.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 132-35; see also Paetel's *Versuchung oder Chance?* pp. 206-22, for the anti-colonial and anti-capitalistic aspects of Strasser's thought.

²²*Ibid.*; see also the introduction to Schueddekopf's work.

²³*Germany Tomorrow*, pp. 142-44.

²⁴Two excellent dissertations have appeared on the significance of autarky for German economics. See Nelson Edmondson, *The Fichte Society* (Harvard, 1964) and Herman Lebovics *Social Conservatism in Germany* (Yale, 1964).

²⁵*Germany Tomorrow*, pp. 183-208.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.

²⁷For an examination of an intricate subject in the history of law which Strasser treats, alas too one-sidedly, see Paul Vinogradoff's *Essays in Legal History* (London, 1913).

²⁸*Germany Tomorrow*, pp. 213-15.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 23-46.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 79-98.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 106-110.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 57; see also *L'Aigle prussien sur l'Allemagne* (New York, 1941), especially the introduction.

³³*Germany Tomorrow*, pp. 58-70.

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 110-115.

³⁵Strasser, *Der Faschismus* (Munich, 1965), p. 106.

³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

³⁷Armin Mohler, *Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland (1918-1932)* (Basel, 1949), pp. 147-151.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 203-07.

³⁹Ernst Juenger, *Auf den Marmorklippen* (Zurich, 1937), p. 103.

⁴⁰For an evaluation of the effects of Nietzsche and Burckhardt upon German nationalists and neo-conservatives, see the introductions to the books by Klemperer and Stern and the conclusion to the study by Mohler.

⁴¹The first world war, as Mohler points out, was only the last of a series of tidal waves which the neo-conservative saw overwhelming the West. The Reformation and the French Revolution were usually regarded as equally destructive events by conservative revolutionaries.

⁴²For a study of this corporatist and anti-parliamentarian strain in modern German thought see R. H. Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State* (New York, 1947).

⁴³*Der Faschismus*, pp. 50-55.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*; also *Germany Tomorrow*, pp. 125-130.

⁴⁵Mohler rightly observes that the neo-conservative, in denying any goal to the historical process, condemns Christianity as well as liberalism; for both philosophies ascribe a design to human events. See *Die konservative Revolution*, p. 149.

⁴⁶*Der Faschismus*, pp. 72-74.

⁴⁷O. Strasser, *Europa von Morgen* (Zurich, 1939), p. 239.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁴⁹For a popularization of this idea, see Hans Kohn's *Mind of Germany* (New York, 1960).