young hospital residents in psychiatry, fresh from the medical schools, have been discouraged from talking or thinking in such terms because they imply "value judgments." Behold the future guardians of our mental health!

Twenty years ago, when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Professor J. Robert Oppenheimer expressed his belief that it would lead to "new institutions and to new patterns of human behavior." When we look about and see the signs of psychopathology everywhere, and see it everywhere condoned, we may begin to wonder if this was what he meant.

Reviewed by Z. JOHN LEVAY, M. D.

The Suez Fiasco


It is nearly ten years now since Britain and France stood up and removed their jackets, so to speak, and took a swing at the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Israeli Army meanwhile giving Egypt a punch in the Sinai peninsula. The short war ended with stationing a mixed contingent of United Nations troops in the border areas, and not much more has been heard from the Suez affair except verdicts of the reporters and publicists and historians, of which there have been a great many, maybe by now thirty or forty books. Behind the literary scene there also has been calculation in the chancelleries of nations, and the general conclusion that the Egyptians and Israelis came out even—propaganda victory for the one, military victory for the other. The French and British lost face, the UN may have lifted its prestige a little, the Russians and Americans have gone on much as before. It is possible to put far worse interpretations on the Suez affair, and many authors have done so. But it does not seem unfair to conclude that Suez highlighted what would have happened anyway—the decline of Britain, the further confusion of French politics.

The three books under review come at Suez in different ways, and one of them, William P. Snyder's Politics of British Defense Policy, only by indirection. Snyder shows the continued postwar efforts at reorganization of Britain's forces. The reader can see three factors in reorganization which also were determinants of the Suez military tactics: successive British governments have shown hesitation to cut Britain's military commitments and have tried a succession of tricks, usually verbal, to avoid letting go (one does not speak of the year of the great let-go, 1947, when Britain lost India, Palestine, and Greece; those places were impossible to hold); secondly, there has been constant lack of funds since 1945, a temptation to keep the wartime and almost any sort of postwar equipment long past its usefulness, simply because there were not enough funds to reequip and do other, usually more pressing, things; and third, despite copying of the American military establishment, which has now gone pretty far, the British have followed Parkinson's law by keeping a large administrative organization for the ever-diminishing forces. This last point is especially interesting. There must be an insuperable obstacle to cutting down on headquarters and "planning" in Britain. For Suez an enormous planning put ashore about 15,000 troops, the equivalent of an American division, to go into operations against scared Egyptian soldiers, many of whom quickly abandoned their uniforms for galabiyyehs.

To the administrative and other problems of Suez, Terence Robertson's Crisis adds the ponderous discussion at the UN. However necessary such discussion, and the many plane flights of high-level personnel between capitals, the night-long vigils high up in the glass building along the East River, the special luncheons ordered and half-eaten, the words from the podium of the Assembly and their multiplication by translators, the measured statements around horseshoe or whatever-shaped tables of the Council: all this commotion over a dubious case in international law now seems to have been unnecessary. It was, perhaps, the last time (as the publicists assert) the British and French, or any formerly great power other than the two superpowers, could have a go at things alone, when the
UN was not set up to do much about such an action. In any event it was necessary to go through the discussion in New York and even to make a show of military force before statesmen in Paris and London gave up their last illusions. Robertson’s book has some novel material, drawn from interviews with the Canadian leader Lester B. Pearson, and letters or private accounts offered by Guy Mollet, Christian Pineau and others. The material shows Pearson’s attempts to mediate between the British and the UN, and the collision between Britain, France, and Israel. It makes even more unconvincing the asserted innocence of the British in face of the accusation that they knew of the impending Israeli attack and timed their own military moves accordingly. Still, this sort of revelation does not change much, as no one in his right mind ever believed the British innocent of collusion with the Israelis. As for Pearson’s work, it is good to have this new account, but then Pearson could only be a broker in Suez diplomacy, not a principal.

A. J. Barker’s *Suez: The Seven Day War* is a retired British officer’s account of planning, hostilities, and retreat, and sets out everything important without making judgments of individual military reputations. Barker blames the politicians—although one cannot be sure he really blames them—he thinks they gave impossible tasks to the military. A non-British and nonmilitary reviewer might find it easier to point a finger at some of the British commanders, maybe the C in C., General Sir Charles Keightley, a “cavalryman,” who set on foot a complex military operation reminiscent of the invasion of France in 1944. This overestimate of the Egyptians, or sheer unwillingness to risk troops or military reputations, resulted in highly questionable tactics, especially the five-day softening up of Egypt by air power, deemed necessary while the lumbering convoy moved west from Malta. Poor Keightley should not get all the blame. But the reviewer finds Barker’s book, despite its merits, exasperating, for surely someone could have done better at Suez, someone could have kicked this operation into high gear, so that when it had the go-ahead from the politicians its forces could have fallen on the Egyptians like a ton of bricks. The Egyptian Army’s inexperience was not altogether unknown. What good were all the new administrative changes in the British Army, as set out in detail by Snyder; what good were the UN meals and plane flights and oratory; what good was the grand armada that showed up off Port Said early on November 6, a forest of masts coming over the horizon, when there was this infernal delay? Barker relates that the weaknesses of the Suez operation are still inherent in the British military establishment. One wonders if some new Lord Haldane could not take over that establishment, institute some judicious retirements perhaps with brevet promotions, maybe giving away free swagger sticks to all retiring cavalrymen, and put things in better order. But, then, it is always easy to offer advice.

Reviewed by ROBERT H. FERRELL

Two Lookout Points


The connecting link between these two books is their concern with American foreign policy and world affairs in general. The backgrounds and points of observation, however, are somewhat different. Mr. Lippmann, sometimes described as a pundit, spends most of his time in Washington, with occasional trips to take soundings in European capitals. As Mr. Weeks tells us in his introduction, Lippmann “from June to September walks the beaches and the uplands of Mount Desert in Maine in reflection.” Mr. Sulzberger, on the other hand, correspondent and commentator for *The New York Times,* is the very model of the restless, peripatetic reporter, logging thousands of miles every year in his search for news developments and including Asia, Africa, and Latin America in his beat as well as Europe.

So it may be that the occupational hazard of Mr. Lippmann is failure to see the trees for the wood, of Mr. Sulzberger to see the wood for the trees. The observer of world events from a distance almost inevitably succumbs at times to the lure of making facile generalizations and sweeping predictions. The down-to-earth reporter, more familiar with the details of many individual pictures, may miss the